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ABSTRACT
Joshua Horvath: Charter School Effects on Charter School Students and Traditional Public School Students in
North Carolina
(Under the direction of Jane Cooley Fruehwirth)
National growth of school choice has raised concerns about charter school effects on charter students and
students left in traditional public schools (TPSs), particularly disadvantaged and minority students. The shift in
North Carolina (NC) charters to serving higher-achieving students supports this concern. While much is known
about charter school effects on charter students in primary school, much less is known about charter high school
effects, and how charters affect TPS students.
My dissertation fills this gap in two ways. First, I use data covering all 9th grade public school students
in NC from 2005 to 2016 to examine charter high school effects on charter student academic outcomes. I use
propensity score matching and find that charters increase student English 1 and ACT scores, and decrease GPA.
Charter school entrants (not in a charter in 8th grade) are more likely than TPS students to be retained in 9th
grade and less likely to graduate in four years. These negative effects are significantly larger for black charter
entrants than white charter entrants.
Second, I use panel data covering all public school students in NC from 1997 to 2016 to examine charter
school effects on TPS student test scores in grades three through eight. Controlling for student and school fixed
effects, I find no overall effect from competition, but higher-achieving charter competition has small positive ef-
fects. Lower-achieving competition has zero to small negative effects and, unlike higher-achieving competition,
increases achievement gaps for some disadvantaged and minority populations.
These results suggest two things. First, the finding of no spillover effects on TPS students and some positive
impacts from charter high schools suggests that the marginal expansion of charters in NC, at the least, does not
hurt public school students. Second, average effects mask a considerable amount of heterogeneity. In particular,
there are more negative charter high school effects on graduation for black charter entrants relative to white, and
achievement gaps are increased from lower-achieving competition. This may suggest resources in charter high
schools be shifted toward black charter entrants, and resources in TPSs facing lower-achieving competition be
shifted to more disadvantaged and minority groups.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
1.1 Introduction
Charter schools are schools of choice that are publicly funded, tuition free, and open to any student regardless
of background. Although charter schools are public schools, they operate outside the normal bounds of the
traditional public school sector with significant flexibility in the use of funds, hiring practices, and curriculum
choice. Since the first charter school legislation was passed in Minnesota in 1991, more than 40 states have
enacted charter school legislation by 2018 (Education Commission of the States), and over 5% of public school
students in the United States attended a charter school as of fall 2014 (National Center for Education Statistics).
Proponents of charter schools have argued two main claims. The first is that charter schools will have a direct
and positive effect on their own student outcomes. This may be due to the increased flexibility and freedom to
adjust learning environments as they see fit, or because competitive forces induce them to improve in order to
attract students. The second claim is that charter schools will have a positive effect on nearby traditional public
schools because charter schools introduce or add to existing competition between schools. On the other hand,
opponents worry that increased flexibility and competitive forces will not drive charter schools or traditional
public schools to improve. Additionally, there is concern that charter schools may negatively affect traditional
public school students by draining resources and talent from traditional public schools.
Researchers have spent considerable time evaluating the effects of charter elementary and middle schools
on their own students. Studies that focus on a subset of over-subscribed charter schools generally find large
positive effects on students’ test scores while studies utilizing fixed effect or matching methods find that charter
schools are similar to traditional public schools in terms of improving student achievement.1 In North Carolina,
researchers find that in more recent years charter schools perform similarly to traditional public schools although,
in earlier years, charter school effects were more negative (CREDO 2009, 2013b; Ladd et al. 2016).
While our knowledge of charter effects on test scores in elementary and middle school has grown substan-
tially, less is known about the effects of charter high schools on longer term outcomes such as ACT scores,
1See section 1.3.1 for a detailed discussion of this literature.
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retention, and high school graduation.2 There are at least two reasons for the more limited literature on charter
high schools and longer term outcomes. The first concerns estimation. The most credible matching estimators
require baseline measures of the outcome of interest. For test scores, this is often easy because end of grade test-
ing is required in grades three through eight. With outcomes such as retention and graduation, there is no lagged
measure available. Additionally, panel data methods are not an option because many high school outcomes are
not observed repeatedly for the same student over time. Second, charter high schools are simply less common
than charter elementary and middle schools and so received less attention. Although test scores are important
in so far as they positively predict longer term student success, it remains important to assess charter effects on
longer term outcomes, such as high school graduation, which is predictive of college attendance, employment,
and wages.
Additionally, much less is known concerning the spillover effects of charter schools on traditional public
school students. The current literature finds mixed results, although generally, even studies that find effects,
find small effects (Betts 2009; Epple et al. 2015).3 Assessing spillover effects is important for two reasons.
First, whether or not the students left in traditional public schools are hurt or helped by charter schools is
important in its own right because more and more students have been exposed to potential spillovers as the
charter sector has grown. Second, credible estimates of the effects of charter schools on their own students
require the assumption that charter schools do not have spillover effects on traditional public schools. For
example, in matching approaches to evaluate the effect of charter schools on their own students, charter students
are often matched to comparison students in nearby traditional public schools. If these traditional public school
students are affected by charter schools, they are no longer valid comparison students for assessing causal
effects.4 Therefore, it is important to assess whether charter schools have spillover effects on traditional public
school students.
My dissertation addresses the limitations in the literature in two ways. First, using data covering all 9th
grade public school students in North Carolina between 2006 and 2012, I examine charter high school effects
of student outcomes including English 1 scores, ACT scores, final GPA, 9th grade retention, and four and five
year high school graduation. I use a regression adjusted propensity score matching approach in which 9th grade
charter school students are matched to comparison traditional public school students with similar 8th grade
2See Section 1.3.2 for a detailed discussion of this literature.
3See Section 1.3.3 for a detailed discussion of this literature.
4This is the first assumption of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) which states that whether a particular unit is
treated does not affect the potential outcomes of other treated units (Imbens and Rubin 2015).
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test scores and demographic characteristics. I find that charter high schools slightly increase English 1 scores,
have moderate positive effects on ACT, and have small negative effects on GPA. I also allow effects to vary by
whether a student was in a charter school in 8th grade and continued in a charter school in 9th grade (stayers)
and whether a student was in a traditional public school in 8th grade and a charter in 9th grade (entrants). I find
that charter school entrants are more likely than traditional public school students to be retained in 9th grade and
less likely to graduate in four years. The negative effects on retention are driven by black students, and black
charter entrants are significantly less likely to graduate than white charter entrants.
Second, using panel data covering all public school students in North Carolina from 1997 to 2016, I ex-
amine the effect of charter schools on traditional public school student math and reading test scores in grades
three through eight. I control for student and school fixed unobservable characteristics and find no overall effect
from charter competition on traditional public school students. However, higher-achieving charter competi-
tion has small positive effects and does not increase achievement gaps for disadvantaged or minority students.
Lower-achieving charter competition has zero to small negative effects and increases achievement gaps for some
disadvantaged and minority groups.
The results from my dissertation suggest three things. First, the finding of no overall competitive effect
suggests that estimates of the effect of charter schools on their own students are not biased by spillovers. How-
ever, the finding of heterogeneous competitive effects based on school and student characteristics suggests that
subgroup analysis of charter school effects on their own students could be biased, although the competition es-
timates are small which suggests the bias may be negligible.5 Second, the finding of no competitive effects on
students left in traditional public schools and some positive effects from charter high schools suggests that the
marginal expansion of charter schools in North Carolina does not hurt public school students, and may even be
beneficial. Third, analysis by student and school characteristics demonstrates that average effects may mask im-
portant heterogeneous effects. In particular, black charter entrants experience more negative effects from charter
high schools than white charter entrants, and lower-achieving charter competition increases achievement gaps
for some disadvantaged and minority groups. This may suggest that charter high schools should shift resources
toward black charter entrants, and traditional public schools facing lower-achieving competition should shift
resources to more disadvantaged and minority groups.
The rest of Chapter 1 proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides more detailed background information on
5The competition estimates are based on competition from charter elementary and middle schools (not high schools) so these results
are only suggestive for high schools. We would have to assume that charter high schools have similar competitive effects on traditional
public high schools as elementary and middle charter schools have on elementary and middle traditional public schools.
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charter schools. Section 1.3 reviews the current literature concerning the effects of charter elementary and mid-
dles schools on their own students, charter high school effects on their own students, and the spillover effects
of charter schools on traditional public school students. I emphasize particular gaps in the literature in order to
motivate my contributions, which are explained in the remaining chapters. Chapter 2 details my empirical ap-
proach and results concerning the effects of charter high schools on charter student academic outcomes. Finally,
Chapter 3 discusses estimation and effects of charter schools on traditional public school student achievement
in North Carolina.
1.2 Background
Charter schools are operated by independent non-profit boards of directors and are freed from many of
the regulations facing traditional public schools, but still must participate in the state accountability program.
Charter schools do not have class size restrictions, curriculum requirements, and are not required to have all
teachers licensed. Additionally, charter schools do not have to provide transportation and do not have to provide
free and reduced price lunch to low income students. They have open enrollment policies, cannot charge tuition,
and cannot be religiously affiliated. Oversubscribed schools must hold lotteries to randomly determine student
entrants.
Funding policies vary by state, but in North Carolina charter schools receive state funding for each student
that is equal to the per pupil allocation for average daily membership in the local education agency (LEA)
in which the charter resides. Additional state funds are appropriated based on the number of students with
disabilities and that are classified as limited English proficient. The LEA in which the charter student resides
is required to transfer an amount equal to the per pupil local current expense appropriation fund of the LEA. In
short, local and state funds follow the student so a local education agency that loses a student is also losing the
funding that is attached to that student. Unlike traditional public schools, charter schools do not receive separate
capital funding for school building construction or renovation.
Charter schools first opened in North Carolina in the 1997-1998 school year with the passage of the Charter
School Act, and sole authority of charter school authorization was given to the State Board of Education.6
Originally, a 100 school cap was placed on the total number of charter schools allowed in operation, but that
cap was lifted in 2011. This created a situation in which the majority of growth in the charter school sector
occurred from 1998 to 2002 and from 2013 to 2016. The final column of Table 1.1 shows the growth of the
charter sector over time. Of all charter school openings between 1998 and 2016, 53% occurred between 1998
6Throughout the paper, school years will be referred to by the spring year. For example, the 1997-1998 school year will be referenced
as 1998.
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and 2002 and 33% between 2013 and 2016. In 1998, 34 charter schools were in operation comprising 1.7% of
all public schools. By 2016, a total of 157 charter schools were in operation or about 6.1% of all public schools.
In North Carolina, traditional public schools normally follow traditional elementary (grades K-5), middle
(grades 6-8), and high school (grades 9-12) grade spans. Charter schools do not follow this traditional pattern
and are more likely to expand grade levels as they age. Table 1.2 shows the distribution of charter school grade
spans the first and last year they are observed between 1998 and 2016. In their first year, about 36% of charter
schools serve only elementary school grades and about 32% serve both elementary and middle school grades.
In their last year observed, only 13% serve only elementary grades, and over 75% span some combination of
elementary, middle, and high school grades. Charter schools serving some high school grade levels are included
in the charter high school analysis which, in their last year observed, includes about 33% of charter schools. The
competitive effect analysis focuses on effects from charter schools serving elementary or middle school grade
levels which, in their last year observed, includes about 80% of charter schools.
1.3 Literature Review
1.3.1 Charter Elementary and Middle School Effects on Charter Students
Studies evaluating the effects of charter elementary and middle schools on student achievement can broadly
be categorized based on the empirical strategy they employ. The main concern in estimation is that charter
school students choose to enroll in charter schools, and therefore may differ in unobservable ways from students
that stay in traditional public schools. The first set of studies, with the strongest internal validity, exploits ran-
dom variation created by oversubscribed charter schools. Over-subscribed charter schools must hold lotteries to
randomly determine student entrants so lottery winners and lottery losers theoretically have similar unobserv-
ables. However, charter school lottery information is not always available so a second group of studies controls
for student selection into charter schools using student fixed effects. Fixed effect methods assume that student
selection is not based on time-varying unobservables after controlling for fixed unobservable student character-
istics and observable time-varying characteristics. Finally, researchers are concerned with the external validity
of lottery and fixed effect studies so several studies use matching or other non-fixed effect regression methods
to evaluate charter school effects. These methods often control for baseline achievement measures and assume
that matched comparison students with similar baseline characteristics to treatment students are also similar in
unobservables.7
7Several studies aggregate information to the school or school-grade level which leads to concerns that the self-selection problem is
not controlled (Miron et al. 2002; Hoxby 2004; Bettinger 2005; Greene et al. 2006; Carlson et al. 2012). A similar problem occurs in
observational studies using student level data that is not longitudinally linked (Eberts and Hollenbeck 2001; Buddin and Zimmer 2005),
and in studies with linked student data that do not control for baseline test scores or student fixed effects (Lauen et al. 2015).
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Lottery based strategies compare lottery winners to lottery losers to assess the effect of over-subscribed
charter schools on their own students. This is termed the intent to treat effect because not all lottery winners
choose to attend a charter school and some lottery losers still go to charter schools. An alternative treatment
effect, and potentially one that is more policy relevant, is the treatment effect on the treated which is estimated
using an instrumental variable strategy where attendance at a charter school is instrumented with the offer of
admission.8 Several studies use lottery based strategies and generally find positive effects on student math and
reading test scores (Hoxby and Rockoff 2004; Hoxby and Murarka 2009; Angrist et al. 2010; Dobbie and Fryer
2011; Abdulkadirolu et al. 2011; Tuttle et al. 2013, 2015). The exception is Gleason et al. (2010) which finds no
effect on student achievement, but does find some positive effects for certain student subgroups.
Although lottery based studies have strong internal validity, they are identifying the effects of over-subscribed
schools which may not be representative of all charter schools, and they are identifying the effects on students in
over-subscribed charter schools who entered through a lottery. In practice, some students enter over-subscribed
charter schools outside the lottery because of sibling preference or other factors.9 Additionally, many charter
schools are not over-subscribed, and, even if they are, their lottery records may not be reliable. Because of these
limitations, several charter school studies utilize student fixed effect strategies.
Studies utilizing student fixed effects find less favorable results than lottery studies. Several studies find
negative effects on both math and reading test scores (Bifulco and Ladd 2006; Sass 2006; Booker et al. 2007;
Hanushek et al. 2007; Ni and Rorrer 2012; Ladd et al. 2016) while Zimmer et al. (2003) find negative effects
on math test scores and no effect on reading test scores, and Witte et al. (2007) find positive effects.10 Several
of these studies also find that charter school effects are more negative when charter schools first open or when
students first enter a charter school, and then become similar to traditional public schools as the charter ages
or the student has been in a charter longer. Two studies find no effect on achievement (Imberman 2011a; Nisar
2012). Finally, while most studies focus on a single state, district, or city, a handful of studies analyze several
areas within the same analysis. Zimmer and Buddin (2006) find no effects in Los Angeles and small negative
effects in San Diego. Zimmer et al. (2009) and Zimmer et al. (2012) find positive effects on math test scores
in Texas, Denver, and Milwaukee. Otherwise they find null to negative effects on math or reading test scores in
8The treatment effect on the treated is more relevant because the intent to treat effect includes students that may not have actually
received treatment (attended a charter school).
9See Zimmer and Engberg (2014) for a more detailed discussion.
10Although Zimmer et al. (2003) find negative effects, they conclude that charters are keeping pace with traditional public schools
because the effects are so small. Additionally, they combine middle and high school into one analysis so I report results only from their
elementary school analysis here.
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Chicago, Denver, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, Ohio, San Diego, and Texas.
Fixed effect estimates are identified from students switching between charter and traditional public schools
which raises concerns over external validity in so far as switchers are not representative of the entire charter stu-
dent population. This may explain the divergent results between fixed effect and lottery based studies because
each focuses on different subpopulations. Studies with the highest external validity rely on matching or regres-
sion based approaches (controlling for baseline test scores) that neither restrict the sample to over-subscribed
charter schools (lottery studies) or student switchers (fixed effect studies). Results from matching and non-fixed
effect regression approaches show mixed results. Several studies find positive achievement effects (Woodworth
et al. 2008; Tuttle et al. 2010; CREDO 2013a; Gleason et al. 2013; Baude et al. 2014), one finds null effects
(Furgeson et al. 2012), and many find negative impacts (CREDO 2009; Berends et al. 2010; CREDO 2011).
Chingos and West (2015) find negative effects on math test scores and no effect on reading test scores.
Perhaps the most comprehensive examination of charter schools was conducted by CREDO. They started
by evaluating charter schools in 16 states (CREDO 2009), and then updated that paper by examining charter
schools in 27 states (CREDO 2013b). Although effects earlier in time were generally negative in math and
reading, the updated report reveals that charter schools are improving over time until they are outperforming
traditional public schools in reading and performing similarly in math. Ladd et al. (2016) uses fixed effects and
also evaluates differences in effects over time in North Carolina and finds that although charter schools do not
outperform traditional public schools, their effects do become less negative over time.11
Given the discussion above, it would be informative to know whether lottery estimates, fixed effect estimates,
and matching estimates are similar when estimated on the same samples. Fortunately, there are several studies
that compare charter school lottery estimates to matching estimates (Abdulkadirolu et al. 2011; Tuttle et al.
2013; Dobbie and Fryer 2013; Fortson et al. 2015), and one study that compares matching estimates to fixed
effect estimates (Davis and Raymond 2012). These studies conduct within-study comparisons in which two
estimation methods are performed on the same sample. For example, matching estimates and lottery estimates
are compared using the same sample of lottery students. These studies generally find qualitatively similar
results between methods, although sometimes the magnitude of effects differs somewhat between methods.
This bolsters the use of fixed effect and matching methods in the charter school literature.
11Epple et al. (2015) provides a review of the literature concerning charter school effects on their own students and the spillover effects
on traditional public schools.
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1.3.2 Charter High School Effects on Charter Students
The literature examining charter high school effects uses several empirical strategies including random as-
signment based on lottery information and observational methods. Oversubscribed charter schools must hold
lotteries to randomly determine student offers of admission. Because the offer is random, comparing lottery win-
ners and losers produces estimates with high internal validity. Abdulkadirolu et al. (2011) examine the effects of
Boston charter high schools using student assignment lotteries and find large positive charter high school effects
on test scores. Angrist et al. (2016) estimate the effects of Boston charter high schools that held lotteries on col-
lege preparation and enrollment. They report higher pass rates on exit exams, increased SAT scores, and a shift
in college enrollment from 2-year to 4-year institutions. Additionally, they find that charter schools substantially
decrease the likelihood of graduating on time, but have no effect on 5-year high school graduation rates or on
high school grade retention in 9th through 11th grade. Finally, Davis and Heller (2017) examine the effect of
Noble Street Charter School in Chicago using randomized lottery information and find large positive effects on
college enrollment and persistence.12 These studies provide an important proof of concept: that the no-excuses
model in two metro areas in the U.S. can have some positive impacts for students - with the exception of effects
on graduating within 4 years in Boston. However, the external validity of these studies is weak since they are
concentrated in two regions and draw from only one type of many charter school educational approaches.
Abdulkadirolu et al. (2011) addresses some generalizability concerns by using OLS on lottery and non-
lottery Boston charter schools controlling for baseline test scores and demographics. They find that, among
lottery schools, the observational estimates are very similar to the lottery estimates. This suggests that observa-
tional estimates are valid and can be extended to estimate impacts for non-lottery charter schools. They find that
non-lottery charter school effects are about half the size of lottery charter effects, suggesting quite limited exter-
nal validity of lottery estimates from the over-subscribed charters in their sample. Additionally, their validation
of observational estimates against lottery estimates supports the empirical strategy I employ in Chapter 2 - at
least in terms of test score outcomes. Because of concerns over external validity and the difficulty of obtaining
lottery information, several studies use observational methods to identify the effects of charter high schools on
student outcomes.
Several studies examining test score effects in elementary and middle school using student fixed effects, pre-
viously discussed in Section 1.3.1, also examine test scores in high school. Zimmer et al. (2003) find secondary
12Dobbie and Fryer (2015) examine the effects of a no-excuses middle school, Promise Academy in the Harlem Children’s Zone, and
find large positive effects on graduating on time, enrolling in college immediately after high school graduation, and enrolling in a 4-year
institution.
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charter schools do slightly better in reading and slightly worse in math, although the authors conclude charters
are keeping pace with traditional public schools. Sass (2006) finds negative charter high school effects on math
scores and no effect on reading with effects becoming more positive as charter schools age. Zimmer and Buddin
(2006) group middle and high school together and find positive reading effects and negative math effects in San
Diego and the reverse in Los Angeles. Ni and Rorrer (2012) find negative high school effects on language arts
scores in the first year a charter opens, and no effect after the first year in Utah. The main concern with the fixed
effect approaches are lack of generalizability because they rely on switchers. Finally, Chingos and West (2015)
control for 8th grade test scores using OLS regression and find negative math effects and no effects on reading or
writing in Arizona. Although these studies provide valuable information in assessing the effectiveness of charter
high schools in raising test scores, they do not examine important longer term outcomes such as ACT scores,
retention, or graduation.
Tuttle et al. (2015) use a matching design to examine the impacts of KIPP charter high schools on test scores
and college readiness. They separately estimate effects for students entering a KIPP charter for the first time
(entrants) and for those continuing from a KIPP middle school to a KIPP high school (stayers). For entrants, they
report positive effects on achievement and graduation, although graduation effects are not statistically significant.
KIPP high schools do not have positive effects on stayer achievement, but stayers are more likely to apply to
college and more likely to take advanced courses than comparison students who did not have the option to attend
a KIPP high school. Furgeson et al. (2012) use propensity score matching to form an appropriate comparison
group to analyze the effects of charter high schools that were overseen by a Charter Management Organization.
They find positive, statistically insignificant effects on graduation and college enrollment. Although the results
concerning KIPP schools and charters under a management organization are informative, these studies lack
generalizability.
Booker et al. (2011) examine charter high school effects in Florida and Chicago using probit estimation
controlling for baseline student characteristics and restricting the sample to students in a charter school in 8th
grade to control for selection. They find that charter schools increase graduation rates from high school and
increase the probability of enrolling in college. Sass et al. (2016) extend the analysis of Booker et al. (2011) in
Florida by examining effects on college persistence and wages. This study restricts the sample to students in
8th grade and uses one-to-one nearest neighbor Mahalanobis matching. They report that charter school students
are more likely to graduate from high school, enroll in college, persist in college, and earn higher wages. The
authors argue that restricting the sample to students who attend a charter school in 8th grade alleviates concerns
over selection bias. However, 9th grade charter school students would then be compared to 9th grade traditional
9
public school students who, in some cases, may have chosen to exit the charter sector which is simply another
form of selection. It is unclear that the sample restriction would increase internal validity, and it necessarily
decreases external validity.
Overall, the literature suggests that charter high schools have some positive effects on high school test
scores, graduation, and college enrollment. At the very least, they are doing no worse than traditional public
schools with the exception of 4-year graduation in Boston and some small negative effects on test scores in
Zimmer and Buddin (2006) and Chingos and West (2015). Generalizability is the main limitation of the current
literature either because samples are restricted to specific geographic regions, particular types of charter schools,
or particular types of charter school students. Additionally, many high school papers focus on test scores and
do not extend the analysis to more important outcomes such as high school graduation. In Chapter 2, I address
the generalizability concerns and examine longer term outcomes including ACT test scores, GPA, retention, and
high school graduation.
1.3.3 Charter Elementary and Middle School Effects on Traditional Public School Students
In addition to concerns over student selection into schools, competitive effect studies are also concerned
over charter school location. If charter schools were randomly assigned location this would not be a concern,
but it is likely that charter schools strategically locate, and location may be correlated with unobservable factors
affecting traditional public school student achievement. Broadly, the literature examining the competitive effects
of charter schools has developed starting with school level analyses using various empirical strategies, then
moving into student and school fixed effect approaches, and finally, several recent papers have shifted to other
empirical methods.
Due to data limitations, early papers on the effects of charter schools on traditional public schools conducted
school level analyses. Measures of competition relied on the quantity of nearby charter schools or charter school
students. Hoxby (2003) uses school level data from Michigan and Arizona, and defines treatment for a traditional
public school as facing charter school enrollment of at least 6% of total public school enrollment in a district.
She finds positive and significant effects on traditional public school test scores in both states. Bettinger (2005)
also utilizes Michigan data but finds no effect of charter schools on traditional public schools. Ni (2009) also
conducts a school level analysis in Michigan, and finds negative effects on achievement although effects are
small in the short-run and become more substantial in the long-run. Hoxby, Bettinger, and Ni are concerned
with non-random charter school location. Hoxby attempts to correct for this using a detrended difference-in-
differences approach, Bettinger relies on an instrumental variable approach using distance from a traditional
public school to a charter authorizing public university as an instrument for the number of charters within a five
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mile radius of a traditional public school, and Ni controls for school specific unobserved linear trends. The main
concern with school level analysis is that average school test scores may be masking student movement. For
example a traditional public school may be feeding a nearby charter school below average students. Then in
a school level analysis, it may appear that traditional public school students improved when in fact the pool of
students changed.13
Later papers employ student level panel data to limit bias from compositional effects. Bifulco and Ladd
(2006) examine the effects of charters on nearby traditional public school students using data from North Car-
olina. They find no effect of charters on traditional public school student test scores using a restricted value
added model of achievement where competition is measured as being near a charter or the number of nearby
charters. In order to account for the endogeneity of charter school location, they use a student-school spell fixed
effect which accounts for any time-invariant unobservables related to charter school location, student movement,
and test score outcomes. Estimates will not be consistent if selection depends on time varying unobservables that
are also related to achievement. Sass (2006) uses the same empirical strategy, but uses the enrollment share of
charters as an additional measure of competition. Results from students in Florida indicate no effect on reading
scores but a positive effect on math scores.
Booker et al. (2008) use a similar empirical model looking at students in Texas and find positive achievement
effects. They make two notable contributions. The first is that they include both district and school level
measures of competition because the district as a whole may respond to competitive pressure from charters.
Second they look at heterogeneous effects based on race and traditional public school quality. Minority students
and lower quality traditional public schools experience the largest positive effects. Zimmer and Buddin (2009)
use California student level data and school principal survey results. A spell fixed effect regression of student
achievement on varying measures of competition, including the number of nearby charters and enrollment share,
finds no effects on student achievement. Survey results from traditional public school principals largely confirms
this empirical finding.
Winters (2012) restricts attention to New York City and uses student attrition to charters as the measure of
competition. Different combinations of school and student fixed effects reveal mixed results when examining
student achievement. The majority of previous studies are confined to one or two states. In order to assess the
generalizability of results, Zimmer et al. (2009) examine competitive effects in seven states. Only Texas reveals
significant positive effects. The empirical approach of this branch of the literature has two main weaknesses.
13Betts (2009) provides a review of the major concerns in estimating charter school competitive effects and the state of the literature.
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First, the spell fixed effect method controls for selection on time-invariant factors, but not for the possibility
that charter schools locate based on unobservable trends in traditional public school achievement. Second, the
literature relies on an assumption that student achievement is perfectly persistent. If it is the case that there is
decay in learning from year to year and lagged achievement is correlated with charter school location, then spell
fixed effect estimates will be inconsistent.
Because of the limitations just mentioned, a few recent papers on this topic have shifted analysis away from
the spell fixed effect approach. Imberman (2011b) examines competitive effects in a large urban district in the
Southwest and employs a novel instrumental variable for being near a charter. The instruments are variations of
the supply of buildings of appropriate size for a charter school. Charter schools do not generally receive funds
for building schools and so rely on local buildings to rent. Results show a statistically significant drop in math
and language test scores. Imberman extends the analysis to other outcomes including attendance and behavior,
and finds significant positive effects in middle and high school. Mehta (2017) models competition to determine
both direct and spillover effects of charter schools and finds small positive spillover effects in North Carolina.
Finally, Cremata and Raymond (2014) and Cordes (2018) allow competitive effects to vary by the achieve-
ment of charter schools relative to the district. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, Cremata and Raymond
(2014) find that being near charter schools with higher achievement positively affects student achievement in
nearby traditional public schools. Using a lagged value added model with school fixed effects, Cordes (2018)
finds no differential effect on math test scores, but a small positive effect on reading test scores from charter
schools with higher achievement. These papers, however, measure a charter school’s achievement relative to
the district rather than relative to the traditional public schools they define as competing with the charter school,
which is arguably the more relevant comparison. Additionally, they lack generalizability because they are con-
fined to two large urban districts.
Overall, the literature paints a very mixed picture of the spillover effects of charter schools on traditional
public schools, although generally effects are null to small in magnitude. The main concerns with the current
literature are reliance on the implausible assumption that what students learn over time perfectly persists, and
reliance on fixed effect methods that may not adequately control for selection concerns. Additionally, more work
is needed to assess heterogeneous effects based on relative school characteristics and student characteristics.
In Chapter 3, I relax the implausible perfect persistence assumption, include linear school trends and lagged
covariates to move beyond student and school fixed effects, and explore heterogeneity based on school and
student characteristics.
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Table 1.1: Traditional Public Schools, Charter Schools, and New Charter Schools by Year
Year
Traditional
Public
School
Count
Charter
School
Count
Charter
Schools
% of All
Public
New
Charter
School
Count
Growth
in
Charter
Schools
1995 1,952 0 0.0% 0 -
1996 1,967 0 0.0% 0 -
1997 1,989 0 0.0% 0 -
1998 2,006 34 1.7% 34 -
1999 2,028 59 2.8% 26 76.5%
2000 2,063 77 3.6% 23 39.0%
2001 2,096 90 4.1% 15 19.5%
2002 2,125 93 4.2% 8 8.9%
2003 2,145 93 4.2% 5 5.4%
2004 2,160 93 4.1% 2 2.2%
2005 2,178 97 4.3% 5 5.4%
2006 2,232 99 4.2% 2 2.1%
2007 2,288 93 3.9% 1 1.0%
2008 2,349 98 4.0% 7 7.5%
2009 2,380 97 3.9% 2 2.0%
2010 2,413 96 3.8% 0 0.0%
2011 2,424 99 3.9% 3 3.1%
2012 2,409 100 4.0% 1 1.0%
2013 2,414 108 4.3% 9 9.0%
2014 2,424 128 5.0% 22 20.4%
2015 2,431 149 5.8% 23 18.0%
2016 2,437 157 6.1% 12 8.1%
All public schools are included, and there is no restriction on school type or grade levels served.
Traditional public schools include magnet schools. The growth in charter schools is defined as
the number of new charter schools divided by the number of charter schools in operation the
previous year.
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Table 1.2: Charter School Grade Spans First Year Observed in the Data and Last Year Observed in the Data,
1998-2016
First Year Charter
Observed in Data
Last Year Charter
Observed in Data
Grade Span Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Elementary 76 36.89 27 13.11
Middle 10 4.85 4 1.94
High 21 10.19 18 8.74
Elementary-Middle 66 32.04 87 42.23
Middle-High 23 11.17 22 10.68
All 10 4.85 48 23.3
Total 206 100 206 100
Elementary includes schools serving only grade levels in kindergarten through five.
Middle includes schools serving only grade levels in six through eight. High in-
cludes schools serving only grade levels in nine through twelve. Elementary-
Middle includes schools serving both Elementary and Middle grade levels. Middle-
High includes schools serving both Middle and High school grade levels. All in-
cludes schools serving Elementary, Middle, and High School levels.
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CHAPTER 2
CHARTER SCHOOL IMPACTS ON HIGH SCHOOL ACADEMIC OUTCOMES IN NORTH
CAROLINA (CO-AUTHORS SARAH CRITTENDEN FULLER, DOUG LAUEN, AND ANDREW
MCEACHIN)
2.1 Introduction
While we know quite a bit about charter school impacts on test scores for elementary and middle school
grades, we know very little about charter school impacts in high school grades. This omission is notable given
that about 500,000 students nationwide are enrolled in charter high schools (Snyder et al. 2016). Additionally,
ACT test scores, high school graduation, and college attendance may be more predictive of later life success
and so of more interest to policymakers and researchers. To date, there are only a small handful of studies of
charter high school impacts on non-test score outcomes which generally report positive effects. Two of these
are lottery-based studies reporting positive impacts of charters in two cities, Boston and Chicago, most of which
subscribe to the so-called no excuses approach (Angrist et al. 2016; Davis and Heller 2017). The fact that these
studies focus on one type of charter in two cities greatly limits the generalizability of inferences about charter
high school impacts of the full range of charters or in different locales. Another study of KIPP, a charter school
network that subscribes to the no excuses philosophy, finds positive high school charter effects as well (Tuttle
et al. 2015). Another set of studies with superior external validity examine citywide effects in Chicago and
statewide effects in Florida using observational data with probit estimation and matching analysis and generally
find positive impacts (Booker et al. 2011; Sass et al. 2016). These studies, however, restrict the sample to
students who were already in a charter school in 8th grade. This limits external validity with an uncertain payoff
to internal validity.
Observational methods may increase external validity over lottery based studies in theory, but the current
literature has limited external validity because it focuses on specific types of charter schools or specific types
of students: only KIPP middle schools or only charter high school students observed in a charter school in 8th
grade (i.e., charter school stayers). The present study fills this gap by examining charter schools in a populous
and diverse state without restricting the analysis to students observed in charter schools in 8th grade. Further,
we add to the literature that goes beyond elementary and middle school test score impacts to examine the ef-
fects of charter high schools on high school achievement and attainment outcomes. Additionally, we explore
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heterogeneous impacts based on characteristics of the student (ethnicity, sex, limited English proficiency status,
disability status) and of the school (grade structure, age, proportion white).
Specifically, using statewide administrative data, we conduct a propensity score analysis with 3:1 nearest
neighbor matching with regression adjustment estimation to estimate impacts on six outcomes: English I end
of course tests, ACT scores, weighted final GPA, retention in 9th grade, four-year high school graduation, and
five-year high school graduation. We include cohorts that began ninth grade between 2004-05 and 2011-2012,
inclusive. Our sample contains nearly 9,500 charter students, more than 700,000 potential comparison students,
and around 12,000 matched comparison students. We attain excellent balance for our preferred specification on
observable 8th grade matching covariates and match about 83% of the treatment group, depending on specifi-
cation. We report four treatment-on-the-treated effects: 1) the effect of attending a charter school in 9th grade,
2) the effect of attending a charter in 9th grade conditional on attending a charter school in 8th grade, 3) the
effect of entering a charter high school in 9th grade for students who were not observed in a charter school in
8th grade (effect on entrants), and 4) the effect of staying in the charter school sector for those already observed
in a charter in 8th grade (effect on stayers).1
In brief, we find weak positive overall effects on English I end of course tests, stronger positive effects on
ACT scores, and small negative effects on GPA. In English 1 and ACT, the charter school effect conditional on
8th grade treatment status (charter or not) is smaller in absolute value than the effect that does not condition
on baseline charter enrollment. In addition, across all three achievement outcomes, the effects are symmetric
between charter entrants and charter stayers. Across the attainment outcomes, we find a different pattern. We
report retention rates, four-year graduation rates, and five-year graduation rates very close to zero in all specifi-
cations. However, we find small differences between entrants and stayers, with entrants facing higher retention
probabilities and lower graduation probabilities than stayers. Furthermore, the increased retention rate for char-
ter entrants is largely driven by black students, and black charter entrants are significantly less likely to graduate
in four or five years than white charter entrants. Students in older charter schools generally experience more
positive effects across outcomes than students in younger charter schools. Finally, students in charter schools
with above average proportions of white students are less likely to be retained and more likely to graduate than
students in charter schools with below average proportions of white students.
1The matching estimator is estimating treatment on the treated effects because comparison students are matched and form a coun-
terfactual for students that are observed in a charter school in 9th grade (rather than students offered admission to a charter school).
However, we define a student as treated even if they leave the charter sector in subsequent years which is reminiscent of an intent to treat
effect.
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2.2 Data
This study uses longitudinal administrative data provided by the North Carolina Department of Public In-
struction (NCDPI). This data includes all students who attended North Carolina public schools, including charter
schools, from 2004-05 to 2015-16. It allows us to follow individual students longitudinally as long as they re-
main enrolled in NC public schools. At the student level this data set contains demographics, including gender,
student ethnicity, an indicator for economic disadvantage, disability, giftedness, limited English proficiency,
state standardized test scores, ACT scores, absences, graduation, GPA, and course taking information. At the
school level, the data set includes percent economically disadvantaged, short terms suspension, violent acts,
ethnic breakdown, per pupil expenditures, urbanicity, and total enrollment.
This study includes seven cohorts of students who began 9th grade for the first time during the 2005-06 to
2011-12 school years. Students are included in the cohort only if they appear in 8th grade and 9th grade in
North Carolina public schools in consecutive years. Students are identified as treatment students if they attend
a charter school anytime in 9th grade. Treatment students who subsequently exit the charter sector (sometime
after 9th grade) are retained in the treatment group. The data set includes 9,496 treatment students enrolled in
a charter school in 9th grade and 709,665 comparison students who enrolled in traditional public schools in 9th
grade. Of these, 7,978 treatment students and 624,174 comparison students have non-missing information on all
control variables and so are eligible to be in the matched sample.
2.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
There are six dependent variables of interest: English 1 end of course test scores, ACT test scores, weighted
final GPA, 9th grade retention, 4-year graduation, and 5-year graduation. Table 2.1 summarizes the dependent
variables of interest, provides missing counts, and summarizes by treatment and comparison groups. English
1 is normally taken in 9th grade, and we standardize the test scores within year to have a mean of zero and
standard deviation of one. Standardization uses the state-wide mean and standard deviation of English 1 scores
as reported in the State Testing Results (Green Book). Starting in 2012, all students in North Carolina enrolled
in grade 11 for the first time are required to take the ACT which means analysis for ACT scores is conducted
on a more limited set of cohorts, 2010-2012. For analysis, ACT scores are standardized to have a mean of
zero and standard deviation of one using the mean and standard deviation in the analytic sample. GPA is final
high school GPA. It is weighted to reflect the difficulty of a course and ranges from zero to six with an average
of 3.08. Students are defined as being retained in 9th grade if they are observed in the data in the 9th grade
for two consecutive years. About 9% of students are retained in the 9th grade. We construct two graduation
variables for whether a student graduates within 4 or 5 years of the first year a student is observed in the 9th
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grade. Graduation is coded as missing if a student leaves the state, dies, leaves for a private school, or leaves
for home school. About 77% of students graduate within 4 years of their first year in high school, and a slightly
higher percent, 79%, graduate within 5 years.
Before matching, treatment students have statistically significantly lower retention rates and higher English
1 test scores, ACT test scores, GPA, and graduation rates. It is unclear whether these differences are causal
or reflect the selection of higher performing students into charter schools. In order to explore this further, we
utilize baseline information from 8th grade or earlier. Student level controls are measured at baseline except for
middle school mobility and passing or failing algebra 1 in middle school. Middle school mobility is an indicator
that is one if a student ever switched schools while observed in grades six through eight. Algebra 1 is counted
whenever a student first takes it in middle school, which could be before 8th grade. Control variables are divided
into three groups listed below.
• Demographic Controls: male, limited English proficient, gifted, disabled, economically disadvantaged,
days absent, days absent squared, middle school mobility, old for grade, interacted economically disad-
vantaged with disabled, and interacted economically disadvantaged with gifted
• Achievement Controls: failed algebra 1 in middle school, passed algebra 1 in middle school, standardized
8th grade math test scores, and standardized 8th grade reading test scores2
• Lagged Local Characteristic Controls: economically disadvantaged, short terms suspension, violent acts,
percent Asian, black, Hispanic, multi-racial, American Indian, white, per pupil expenditures, urbanicity,
and enrollment
Old for grade is an indicator that is one of a student is strictly greatly than 15 years old by the 1st of
September of his or her 8th grade year. Lagged local characteristics are the lagged average characteristics of
the five nearest traditional public high schools within 15 miles of the high school a student is attending in
9th grade. For traditional public schools, this average includes the traditional public school itself, but charter
schools are always excluded from the local average. Essentially, this requires that treatment students are matched
to comparison students in high schools with similar local characteristics.
The first two columns of Table 2.2 display means of the control variables by treatment group, and suggest that
students attending charter schools in 9th grade are different along several observable dimensions than traditional
2It is possible to use 6th or 7th grade test scores as well, but not all students observed in 8th grade are observed in 6th and 7th grade so
the estimating sample would be reduced. For example, about 20% of students with non-missing information on all the control variables
and 8th grade test scores are missing either 7th grade math or reading test score information.
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public school students. For example treatment students are much more likely to have attended a charter school
in 8th grade, are significantly more likely to be white, and have higher 8th grade math and reading test scores
than comparison students. This suggests simply comparing mean outcomes is not causal, and more sophisticated
econometric methods are needed.
2.3 Analysis
The main concern when estimating the effects of charter high school attendance on student outcomes is that
students choose whether or not to attend a charter school, and the choice to attend may be based on unobservable
student or family characteristics that are also correlated with student outcomes. For example, more motivated
parents may be more likely to enroll their children in charter schools. Conversely, students performing poorly
in charter schools may be more likely to exit to traditional public schools. Selection comes in two forms. First,
students not enrolled in a charter school in 8th grade may select into a charter high school in 9th grade (entrants).
Second, students already enrolled in a charter school in 8th grade may select out of the charter sector even though
they can continue in the charter sector into 9th grade (leavers). The option to continue in the same charter school
from 8th to 9th grade is prevalent in North Carolina because the majority of charter high schools are combination
schools serving both middle and high school grade levels. Table 2.3 displays the frequency of different types
of student moves between charter and traditional public schools between 8th and 9th grade. There are 6,663
9th grade charter students that were in a combination charter school in 8th grade or a charter school expanding
to serve 9th grade (combo schools), which makes up about 65% of all 9th grade charter students. We denote
students that stay within the charter sector between 8th and 9th grade “stayers” and those that enter the charter
sector in 9th grade and were not in a charter in 8th grade “entrants”. In terms of Table 2.3, rows 5 and 7 are
stayers and rows 2 and 3 are entrants which implies that 70% of 9th grade charter students are stayers and 30%
are entrants.
In order to control for student selection, we utilize a two-step approach. First, we use propensity score
matching to construct a comparison group of traditional public school students that are similar in baseline char-
acteristics to charter school students. Second, we use weighted regression on this matched sample controlling
for the same set of covariates used in the first step. Together, this provides a regression adjusted propensity score
matching estimator that is more robust than matching or regression alone, which is discussed in more detail
shortly.
More specifically, baseline is defined as 8th grade, and treatment Ti is defined as students that attend a charter
school at any point in 9th grade. Let Yi(1) denote the potential outcome of student i had he or she attended a
charter in 9th grade (Ti = 1) , and Yi(0) denote the potential outcome of student i had he or she attended a
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traditional public school in 9th grade (Ti = 0). We are interested in the average effect of attending a charter high
school for those that attended a charter high school, or in terms of our notation
∆tt = E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Ti = 1], (2.1)
which is termed the treatment on the treated. For an individual student, both potential outcomes cannot be
observed, so we require the construction of an appropriate counterfactual. Because of the selection issues already
noted, we cannot simply compare the difference in means between students who do and do not attend a charter
high school in 9th grade. Rather, we assume conditional independence: conditional on observable characteristics
Xi, the potential outcome under no treatment Yi(0) is independent of treatment Ti,
Yi(0) ⊥ Ti|Xi. (2.2)
In other words, once we match students on observable baseline characteristics, whether a student receives treat-
ment or not is unrelated to the outcome a student would realize if not treated, and comparing the difference in
means between the treated and matched comparison students is an unbiased estimate of the treatment on the
treated.3 Instead of exact matching on observable characteristics, we follow the approach of Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) and match on the probability of treatment (propensity score) to reduce dimensionality.4
In the first step, the probability of attending a charter school in 9th grade is modeled as
Prob(Ti = 1) =
eα0+Xiα1+γc
1 + eα0+Xiα1+γc
, (2.3)
where Ti is the treatment status of student i,Xi is a vector of control variables, and γc is cohort fixed effects. The
propensity models are estimated using logistic regression. The control vector consists of three main sets of vari-
ables: demographic controls, achievement controls, and lagged local characteristics. After propensity scores are
estimated, treatment students are matched to up to 3 students with nearest propensity scores (nearest neighbors).5
3It is not necessary to assume independence from Yi(1) because we are interested in the treatment effect on the treated (Imbens
2004).
4Because we do not exact match on covariates (we match on similar propensity scores within a pre-specified range), covariates will
differ between matched treatment and comparison students. This may introduce some bias, but the estimator is consistent because we
are matching on only one continuous variable - the propensity score (Imbens 2004; Abadie and Imbens 2006; Imbens and Wooldridge
2009).
5Matching to the three nearest neighbors rather than one nearest neighbor may introduce a small amount of additional bias, but the
larger comparison group increases efficiency. In practice, we find highly similar results regardless of the number of matches - one, three,
or five.
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Matching is with replacement, so the same comparison student can be matched to multiple treatment students.
Matches are restricted to be within 0.01 units of the treated propensity score to ensure match quality. A student
is not allowed to be matched to students in different cohorts (exact matching on cohort). Treatment students
with propensity scores more than a 0.01 unit difference from any potential comparison students are unmatched
and omitted from the analysis. After matching, the treatment and comparison group observable characteristics
are compared to assess balance.
In the second step, treatment effect estimation is carried out on the matched sample using OLS or Logit
estimation using the following regression model:
Yi = β0 + β1Ti +Xiβ2 + λc + i, (2.4)
where Yi is outcome for student i, Ti is an indicator for attending a charter school in 9th grade, Xi is the same
vector of covariates used in the propensity score model, λc are cohort fixed effects, and i is an idiosyncratic
error. The model includes the same set of covariates used in the matching process in order to control for any
remaining differences between the treatment and comparison groups and to increase precision. Standard errors
are clustered at the high school level. OLS regression is used for continuous outcomes: standardized English
1 scores, standardized ACT scores, and weighted GPA. Logistic regression is used for dichotomous outcomes:
retained in 9th grade, graduated in 4 years, and graduated in 5 years.
The regression is weighted because in the matching process some comparison students are matched to mul-
tiple treatment students and some treatment students match to less than three nearest neighbors. Treatment
students always receive a weight of one. Comparison students are re-weighted so that the sum of comparison
weights is equal to the number of matched treatment students. For example, if no comparison student was
matched more than once and each treatment student was matched to exactly three comparison students, each
matched comparison student would be weighted one-third, and the matched comparison weights would sum to
the total number of matched treatment students. If one of the comparison students was matched to two treatment
students, that student’s weight would be adjusted to two-thirds.
With the addition of the second estimation step in equation 2.4, the coefficient, β2, is a two-step estimator,
termed a regression adjusted propensity score matching estimator. Regression adjusted matching estimators are
considered better in practice than regression or matching on its own (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009; Abadie and
Imbens 2011). This is because, after matching on the propensity score, small differences remain between the
covariates of the treatment and matched comparison students. Regression reduces the bias from these differences
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(Imbens 2004). Additionally, this estimator is robust to misspecification of the regression function in the second
step (Abadie and Imbens 2011).
2.3.1 Charter 8th Grade Control
Propensity score matching provides strong protection against selection bias in so far as selection into or
out of charter schools is uncorrelated with unobservable characteristics conditional on observable baseline char-
acteristics. Charter high schools present a unique context because students may have already selected into a
charter school before high school. Some prior studies restrict analysis to students that attended a charter school
in 8th grade with the idea that unobservable characteristics predicting selection into a middle school charter also
predict selection into a high school charter (Booker et al. 2011; Sass et al. 2016). They argue that this restriction
limits selection bias at the cost of some external validity.
While it is important to control for 8th grade charter status, either because it controls for selection or because
it captures lagged effects from prior charter attendance, we pursue a different approach in this paper. We contend
that a sample restricted to only students observed in 8th grade in charter schools limits external validity with
uncertain benefits to internal validity. If we restrict the sample to students who attended a charter in 8th grade,
students who chose to stay in a charter will be compared to students who chose to exit. The validity of this
comparison rests on the assumption that selection out of a charter school is independent of any unobservable
shocks. In other words, we are assuming that selection out of treatment is controlled. Conversely, if we restrict
the sample to students who did not attend a charter in 8th grade, students who chose to enter a charter will be
compared to those that did not. In other words, we are assuming that selection into treatment is controlled.
It is unclear whether matching methods would control for selection out of treatment while not controlling for
selection into treatment, so we include estimates for both sets of students.
In practice, we specify a model that both matches and controls for 8th grade charter school status (CH 8th)
and separately identifies the effect of charter attendance for 9th grade charter students that did not attend a charter
in 8th grade (Entrant) and those that are continuing in a charter from 8th grade (Stayer). After matching, we
fit an outcome model with indicator variables for these two types of students:
Yi = δ0 + δ1Entrant+ δ2Stayer+ δ3CH 8th+Xiβ2 +CH 8th×Xiβ3 +λc +CH 8th×λc + i. (2.5)
This model implies that students in a charter school in 9th grade that were not in a charter school in 8th grade
(entrants) are compared to 9th grade traditional public school students that were also not in a charter in 8th
grade. Conversely, 9th grade charter students that were in a charter in 8th grade (stayers) are compared to 9th
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grade traditional public school students that were in a charter in 8th grade (leavers). In estimation, all covariates
and cohort fixed effects are interacted with the indicator for being in a charter school in 8th grade. This implies
that δ2 can be interpreted as if we had restricted the sample to students in a charter school in 8th grade, and can
be compared to charter school impacts from prior studies that utilize this restriction (Booker et al. 2011; Sass
et al. 2016).
2.3.2 Robustness Checks
The primary threat to identification is that unobservable student characteristics are correlated with a student’s
decision to enroll in a charter high school and are correlated with high school outcomes. Fortunately, there are
several potential robustness checks available to assess the extent of this potential source of bias.
Restricted Matching Estimators
The majority of charter high school students were also in a charter school in 8th grade so we are particularly
concerned that students who choose to leave their charter school between 8th and 9th grade when they could have
continued (leavers) are systematically different from those that choose to stay (stayers). As a check, we restrict
the potential match comparison group for students in charter schools in 9th grade to students in traditional public
schools in 9th grade that did not choose to exit a charter school when they could have continued in that charter
school. In terms of Table 2.3, the excluded students comprise row six, and are charter leavers. For example,
students in a charter middle school that does not serve high school grades who move to a traditional public
school for 9th grade are potential matches. Students in combination charter schools serving middle and high
school grades who left their charter school in 9th grade are not available to match. If students that choose to exit
the charter sector are systematically different from those that stay, we expect the restricted matching estimates
to differ from the baseline matching estimates. Our restricted matching estimator is similar to the strategy in
Tuttle et al. (2015). They compare KIPP high school students who were in a KIPP middle school to other KIPP
middle school students who did not have the option to attend a KIPP high school.
Local Matching Estimators
It is also possible that charter schools locate in areas based on unobservable local or traditional public school
characteristics that predict student achievement. All estimation results include lagged controls for the average
characteristics of nearby schools in order to match students with comparable local environments; however, un-
observable differences may still exist. We conduct local matching in which charter high school students are only
allowed to match to students in one of the nearest five traditional public schools that are within 15 miles of the
charter school. If the baseline comparison group is located in areas with different unobservable characteristics
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than the treatment group, we expect the local-matching estimates to differ from baseline. However, local match-
ing may increase the likelihood that charter stayers are matched to charter leavers which is precisely what the
restricted matching estimator in the previous section tries to avoid. Because of this, it is not clear whether diver-
gent results from local matching are due to unobservable local characteristics or bias from matching to leavers
who are systematically different from stayers.
Non-Local Matching Estimators
We also conduct non-local matching such that charter students in 9th grade can only be matched to students
in traditional public schools that are not one of the five closest schools to the charter school or that are not within
15 miles of a charter school. Students in traditional public schools farther from charter schools may not have the
option to attend, but still possess unobservable characteristics driving selection into charter schools and so be
superior matches than local students that choose not to enter a charter high school or choose to exit their charter
school. If students in local areas with charter schools that choose not to attend a charter high school are different
in unobserved ways, we expect non-local matching estimates to differ from the baseline matching estimates.
This is slightly different from the restricted matching estimator because the restricted estimator only restricts the
potential matches for stayers (they can not be matched to leavers), while the non-local matching estimator also
restricts the potential matches for entrants.
2.3.3 Heterogeneity by Student Characteristics
Often charter schools target certain student populations or specialize so it is possible that charter school
effects vary by student characteristics. We explore heterogeneity based on student ethnicity, sex, limited English
proficiency status, and disability status.
2.3.4 Heterogeneity by School Characteristics
We explore how treatment effects vary based on school characteristics along several dimensions. First,
charter schools are more likely than traditional public schools to serve both middle and high school grade levels.
About 87% of 9th grade charter school students are in combination schools compared to only 3% of traditional
public school students. It is possible that these combination high schools are better for student outcomes because
of the school structure. In order to explore this possibility, treatment is interacted with a dummy variable for
whether a school is a combination high school or not, and the indicator is also included as a main effect. By
including the combination indicator and the interaction, we are comparing charter school students in combination
schools to traditional public school students in combination schools.
We also evaluate whether charter school effects are more positive the older the charter school by including
an indicator for whether a school is more than 7 years old and the interaction of this indicator with treatment
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in the regressions. On average charter schools in North Carolina are younger than traditional public schools, so
it is important to rule out the possibility that charter school effects are biased by the age of the school. In our
sample, about 9% of 9th grade charter students are in schools strictly less than 8 years old, and about 7% of 9th
grade traditional public school students are in school less than 8 years old. Finally, an indicator is constructed
for whether a school has a higher proportion of white students than average which serves as a proxy for socio-
economic status. This indicator variable and its interaction with treatment are included in regressions to assess
whether charter school effects vary based on the demographic make-up of the school.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Balance
Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics for demographics, pre-treatment achievement, and lagged local charac-
teristics for students who attended 9th grade at a charter school and those who attended 9th grade at a traditional
public school. The left panel shows the means and balance test for the entire sample before matching. The
balance test is the normalized difference
∆tc = 100× X¯t − X¯c√
s2t+s
2
c
2
. (2.6)
The difference in treatment and comparison means (X¯t−X¯c) is standardized by the square-root of the average of
the sample variances in the treatment and comparison groups.6 Before matching, nearly all of the demographics
and all of the pre-treatment achievement variables have a percent bias that is above the rule of thumb threshold
of 10, indicating that the two groups are unbalanced. In particular, students who attend charter schools in 9th
grade have higher 8th grade performance and are much more likely to have attended a charter school in 8th
grade (72 percent of treatment students compared to just 1 percent of comparison students). The right panel of
Table 2.2 shows the same means and balance test for the matched sample of students. An examination of this
data reveals that all variables are well below the 10 percent bias threshold indicating that balance is achieved on
all variables.
2.4.2 Main Results
Throughout the results section, tables are divided into achievement outcomes (test scores and GPA) and
attainment outcomes (retention and graduation). Table 2.4 displays the results of the propensity score matching
6This is different from the t-statistic which divides each sample variance by the number of units in each sample. The t-statistic is
sensitive to sample size, and we have a large sample. Therefore we may be able to detect very small differences in group means, but we
are not interested in hypothesis tests concerning the difference in means. We are interested in assessing how similar the treatment and
comparison samples are before and after matching.
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analysis on the English 1 End of Course test score, the ACT composite score, and weighted final GPA. The first
model for each outcome shows the coefficient on the 9th grade charter indicator with no control for whether the
student attended a charter school in 8th grade. The second column shows the same 9th grade charter effect with
an 8th grade charter attendance control included in the set of covariates. The third column for each outcome
separates the treatment variable between 9th grade charter attendees who also attended a charter in 8th grade -
stayers - and 9th grade charter attendees who did not attend a charter in 8th grade - entrants. The coefficient
for stayers compares charter sector stayers to students who attended a charter in 8th and then a traditional
public school in 9th. The coefficient for entrants compares charter student entrants to students who attended a
traditional public school in both 8th and 9th grade.
The left most outcome panel displays the effect of charter attendance in 9th grade on English 1 test scores.
The first column shows a moderate positive impact of charter attendance of 0.11 standard deviations. Including
the 8th grade charter control in the second model reduces the size of the effect by about two thirds, but the effect
remains positive and statistically significant. When the effect is considered separately for charter entrants and
charter stayers, the coefficients are both positive, but only the coefficient for stayers is statistically significant.
Significant differences between stayers and entrants are marked with the letter a in the tables. The effect for
entrants and the effect for stayers are not statistically different from one another. In the middle outcome panel,
which shows the impact of 9th grade charter enrollment on ACT scores, coefficients are large and positive in
all three models, although they are largest in the model that does not include a control for 8th grade charter
attendance. There is no statistically significant difference between entrants and stayers for ACT scores. Turning
to GPA in the third outcome panel, there is no effect in the first model, but once the control for 8th grade charter
attendance is added in the second model, there is a statistically significant negative effect on GPA. When the
treatment group is split between entrants and stayers, there is no statistically significant difference in the impact
between treatment groups, and across all models the effect is quite small - less than a tenth of a quality point.
Table 2.5 shows the results of the propensity score analysis for 9th grade retention, high school graduation
within four years, and high school graduation within five years. The left outcome panel displays the results of
the three models for 9th grade retention. In the first two models, students who attended charter schools in 9th
grade were retained at rates that were not statistically different from students who attended traditional public
schools, and the point estimates are extremely small. However, there is a statistically significant positive effect
on entrants, and this difference is statistically significantly different from stayers. The middle outcome panel
shows the impact of charter school attendance in 9th grade on graduating from high school within four years.
The combined indicator in the first two models shows no statistically significant impact of charter schools on
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graduation. However, when 9th grade charter school students are divided into entrants and stayers, there is a
small but statistically significant negative effect on graduation for charter school entrants which is statistically
different from stayers. The right outcome panel shows the results for graduating from high school within five
years. In this panel, 9th grade charter school students do not significantly differ from students who attended
traditional public schools. However, 9th grade charter school entrants and stayers have point estimates that are
in different directions and are statistically significantly different from each other with charter entrants less likely
to graduate within 5 years than stayers.
2.4.3 Robustness Check Results
In addition to the preferred model, we conducted analyses using three different modifications to the matched
sample. The first set of models, which we term “restricted matching” models, restrict potential matches to
not include students in a charter school in 8th grade that could have attended that same charter school in 9th
grade, but chose to attend a traditional public school. The rationale for these models is that these “leavers” may
differ in unobservable ways from stayers, while students who leave a charter school from 8th to 9th grade when
they did not have the option to attend may be more similar to stayers. The second set of models, which we
term “local matching” models, restricts potential matches for each charter school student to the five traditional
public schools that are geographically closest (within 15 miles) to the charter school in which the treatment
student is enrolled. The rationale for these models is that students who reside and attend school near one another
experience a similar set of unmeasured local conditions. The third set of models, which we term “non-local
matching” models, limits potential matches to students who attend traditional public schools that are not within
the local matching group - that is schools that are not among the five closest to any charter high school. The
rationale for these models is that students who attend schools that are not “local” to any charter high school do
not have the option to select a charter high school and, therefore, may possess unmeasured characteristics that
drive charter school selection but simply have no available option.
Across all outcomes presented in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7, the results for restricted and non-local matching
(presented in the 2nd and 4th column of each outcome panel) produce results that are in the same direction and
similar in magnitude to the results found in the preferred model (presented in the 1st column of each outcome
panel), though in some cases statistical significance varies across models. The main divergence in findings
comes from local matching presented in the third column of each outcome panel in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. Although
ACT and GPA results are similar between the preferred estimates and local matching, there are differences in
English 1, retention, and graduation. Interestingly, the differences are isolated to the stayer effects and not the
entrant effects. In practice, balance in baseline covariates is not achieved with local matching so the somewhat
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divergent results are not surprising, and may be due to restricting stayer matches to students who chose to
exit charter schools when they could have stayed. The similarity of the results across restricted and non-local
matching approaches suggests that they are robust to variations in model selection. Our preferred estimates are
from the unrestricted matching model because balance is strongest with this model, and because results from the
more restrictive matching estimators are similar to the unrestricted results.
2.4.4 Heterogeneity by Student Characteristics Results
Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 display results by ethnicity for achievement and attainment outcomes, respectively.
The first column in each outcome panel shows the marginal effects for each ethnic subgroup without controlling
for 8th grade charter status. The estimates in the first row can be interpreted as the difference in the outcome
variable between white charter students and white traditional public school students. The second column adds
the charter 8th indicator, and the third column divides effects by entrant and stayer. The first estimate in the
third column of each outcome panel can be interpreted as the difference in the dependent variable between white
charter entrants and white traditional public school students not in a charter school in 8th grade.
In terms of achievement outcomes, effects do not differ by ethnicity with few exceptions. In column 8 of
Table 2.8, Hispanic entrants relative to Hispanic traditional public school students not in a charter in 8th grade
have statistically significantly lower ACT scores than white entrants relative to white traditional public school
students not in a charter in 8th grade. Significant differences relative to white students are marked with the
letter a, and effects significantly different from zero are starred. Additionally, the Hispanic entrant subgroup and
other entrant subgroup have higher GPAs than white entrants. Attainment outcomes do vary by ethnicity. Black
charter entrants are more likely to be retained and less likely to graduate within 4 or 5 years than white charter
entrants. Other entrants and Hispanic entrants are more likely to graduate within 5 years than white entrants,
and Hispanic stayers are more likely to graduate within 4 years than white stayers.
Effects by other student characteristics including sex, limited English proficiency, and disability are pre-
sented in Table 2.10 and Table 2.11 for achievement and attainment outcomes, respectively. Effects on male
students are more positive than female students in terms of English 1 and ACT. However, male stayers have
significantly lower GPAs than female stayers. Male stayers are also more likely to graduate on time than female
stayers. In general, effects by limited English proficiency are not statistically significantly different. This is
likely due to a lack of power because so few students are classified as limited English proficient. In general
though, limited English proficient students experience similar or more positive effects across outcomes and are
statistically significantly less likely to be retained in 9th grade. Finally, disabled charter entrants have higher En-
glish 1, ACT, and GPA than non-disabled charter entrants. This may reflect the selection of more able disabled
28
students into charter schools. In other words, a simple disabled indicator may not adequately capture the range
of learning disabilities. Effects on attainment measures do not differ significantly by disability status.
2.4.5 Heterogeneity by School Characteristics Results
Effects by school characteristics including combination schools, school age, and proportion white are in-
cluded in Tables 2.12 and 2.13 for achievement and attainment outcomes, respectively. Marginal effects are
presented for entrants and stayers by the school characteristics, and statistically significant differences at the
10% level between charter students in schools with the characteristic and those without are marked with the let-
ter a. Recall that combination high schools are high schools that serve high school grades and some grade levels
below high school which is very common among charter schools. Combination charter schools have negative
effects on charter stayer ACT test scores and non-combination charter schools have positive effects on charter
stayer ACT test scores. The difference is statistically significant. Additionally, combination charter schools
relative to non-combination charter schools decrease the probability of retention and increase the probability
of graduation for both charter entrants and stayers. Overall, this suggests that combination charter schools,
which are more prevalent, improve student attainment more than non-combination charter schools. Older char-
ter schools increase the likelihood charter stayers graduate within 4 years relative to younger charter schools.
Across the other outcomes, effects are not statistically significantly different by school age. Finally, charter
stayers in schools with above average proprotions of white students score significantly higher on tests and have
higher GPAs than charter stayers in schools with below average proportions of white students. Furthermore,
charter schools with higher proportions of white students decrease retention rates and increase graduation rates
relative to charter schools with lower average proportions of white students.
2.5 Conclusion
The current evidence on the effectiveness of charter high schools is much smaller than elementary and middle
school grades, and is limited by two main factors. First, the majority of prior high school evaluations focus on
charter schools that follow the no-excuses model. Second, larger evaluations of high school charters rely on
samples of students who started in a charter school in 8th grade. These two factors therefore limit what we
know about the effectiveness of the vast majority of charter high schools. As enrollment in charter schools has
and continues to increase, it is important for students, parents, policymakers, and educators to have a detailed
understanding of effectiveness of a growing sector of schools on students’ short- and long-term outcomes.
The results of this paper build on the charter school literature in two ways. First, we used state-wide,
longitudinal data to evaluate the effect of North Carolina charter high schools on students’ achievement and
attainment. While studies of no-excuse charter schools in a handful of urban districts report positive effects on
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achievement and attainment, less is known about the rest of the charter high school population. Using state-wide
data for a diverse state, our work can speak to whether a broader range of charter schools also positively affect
student outcomes. Similar to prior work, our results document the need to account for students 8th grade charter
school status in high school evaluations. Our results also suggest a symmetry in charter school experiences for
students new to charter schools in 9th grade and students who stayed in charter schools between 8th and 9th
grade in terms of achievement outcomes and an asymmetry with respect to attainment outcomes. It is unclear
whether this is true in prior studies which focused just on a sample of students who already attended charters in
8th grade.
Second, our paper incorporates a matching procedure which includes students who did and did not already
enroll in a charter school in 8th grade. Our matching procedure includes 8th grade charter status as a predictor
variable, and we report results with and without controlling for 8th grade status. We also separately estimate the
effect of switching into and staying in charter schools in 9th grade. Both margins are important for consumers,
educators, and policymakers as they represent potentially different educational decisions, as well as extend our
external validity to more students.
The current results paint a mixed picture on the effects of North Carolina’s charter schools on students’ high
school outcomes. The results of our analysis show that students in charter schools, both stayers and entrants,
experience small increases in ELA achievement and moderate increases in ACT achievement. Interestingly,
although students are learning more, as measured by standardized test scores, we find stayers and entrants have
slightly lower grades and entrants are 3 percentage points less likely to graduate in four years, on average, than
their TPS peers. These results may suggest charter schools have higher standards, and students new to the higher
standards (entrants) have a tougher time adjusting than students exposed to charter schools in 8th grade (stayers).
Our future work will build on these initial outcomes to include two- and four-year college attainment, voting
behavior, and criminal behaviors. The results will help address an information gap in the charter high school
literature, as well as help parents in North Carolina make more informed choices.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
English 1
(Standardized)
ACT
(Standardized)
GPA (Weighted)
Retained 9th
Grade
Graduate 4 Years Graduate 5 Years
Summary Statistics (Before Matching)
Mean 0.05 0.00 3.08 0.09 0.77 0.79
Standard Deviation 0.97 1.00 0.95 0.29 0.42 0.41
Min -4.04 -3.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 3.16 3.48 6.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cohorts Available 2006-2012 2010-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2011
Missing Count 70,169 67,667 224,223 0 33,934 28,869
Non-Missing Count 648,992 239,619 494,938 719,161 685,227 587,989
By Treatment (Before Matching)
Treatment Mean 0.45* 0.56* 3.26 0.04* 0.87* 0.88*
Treatment Observations 8,889 4,690 5,910 9,496 9,017 7,106
Comparison Mean 0.05 -0.01 3.08 0.09 0.77 0.79
Comparison Observations 640,103 234,929 489,028 709,665 676,210 580,883
By Treatment (After Matching)
Treatment Mean 0.48 0.58 3.26* 0.04 0.88 0.89
Treatment Observations 7,534 4,329 4,773 7,861 7,471 5,644
Comparison Mean 0.46 0.45 3.48 0.04 0.89 0.89
Comparison Observations 11,381 5,546 8,717 11,955 11,319 9,000
The sample includes pooled 9th grade cohorts from 2006-2012. Treatment students attended a charter school anytime during 9th grade. The sample is restricted to students observed in
both 8th and 9th grade. Matching is based on Logit regression using up to 3 nearest neighbors within 0.01 of the treatment propensity score and includes as predictors all demographic
characteristics, achievement variables, local characteristics, an indicator for charter 8th, and the interactions of charter 8th with demographic, achievement, and local characteristics.
Stars indicate statistically significant differences between treatment and control groups at the 5% level.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Treatment and Comparison Groups Before and After Matching
Before Matching After Matching
Variable
Comparison
Mean
Treatment
Mean
%bias
Comparison
Mean
Treatment
Mean
%bias
Demographics
Charter 8th 0.01 0.72 213.83 0.71 0.71 -0.44
Male 0.51 0.47 -6.63 0.46 0.47 1.82
Asian 0.02 0.02 -0.18 0.03 0.02 -2.97
Black 0.29 0.19 -22.66 0.20 0.19 -2.47
Hispanic 0.08 0.04 -19.45 0.04 0.04 -2.82
American Indian 0.01 0.01 -0.32 0.01 0.01 0.55
MultiRacial 0.03 0.02 -3.23 0.02 0.02 1.44
White 0.57 0.71 31.08 0.69 0.71 3.73
Limited English Proficient 0.04 0.01 -20.23 0.02 0.01 -4.54
Gifted 0.17 0.10 -20.74 0.11 0.10 -1.79
Disabled 0.10 0.09 -3.32 0.09 0.09 1.03
Econ Disadvantaged 0.45 0.16 -65.37 0.18 0.17 -2.73
Days Absent 8.13 6.40 -23.38 6.47 6.41 -1.00
Days Absent Squared 136.57 80.11 -15.66 86.09 80.45 -1.90
Middle School Mobility 0.20 0.32 27.83 0.32 0.32 1.29
Old for Grade 0.19 0.13 -17.13 0.13 0.13 0.25
Econ Disadvantaged * Disabled 0.06 0.02 -21.42 0.02 0.02 -1.28
Econ Disadvantaged * Gifted 0.03 0.01 -14.04 0.01 0.01 0.49
Achievement
Failed Alg 1 in Middle School 0.01 0.04 15.69 0.04 0.03 -0.79
Passed Alg 1 in Middle School 0.20 0.39 42.80 0.40 0.39 -2.49
Standardized 8th Grade Math Score 0.00 0.27 27.01 0.28 0.27 -0.91
Standardized 8th Grade Reading Score 0.00 0.38 39.76 0.37 0.38 0.38
Lagged Local Characteristics
Econ Disadvantaged Local 40.24 37.23 -23.90 38.19 37.56 -5.26
Short Term Suspensions Local 35.69 36.59 5.00 37.04 36.34 -3.98
Violent Acts Local 16.07 16.29 3.41 16.36 16.20 -2.56
Asian Pct Local 2.52 2.70 7.63 2.81 2.73 -3.71
Black Pct Local 31.41 32.54 6.31 33.40 32.49 -5.37
Hispanic Pct Local 7.35 7.69 7.54 7.97 7.64 -7.34
MultiRacial Pct Local 2.41 2.43 1.56 2.47 2.43 -3.46
American Indian Pct Local 1.29 0.52 -19.59 0.53 0.52 -0.27
White Pct Local 54.90 54.08 -4.39 52.79 54.15 7.74
PPE Local 8282.54 8191.39 -7.90 8243.90 8180.72 -6.18
Urban Local 0.26 0.24 -6.66 0.26 0.24 -3.67
Rural Local 0.32 0.27 -15.31 0.26 0.27 2.90
Suburb Local 0.12 0.09 -13.14 0.09 0.09 2.91
Town Local 0.12 0.11 -4.32 0.11 0.11 -0.04
Enrollment Local 1243.02 1348.55 21.53 1334.87 1358.17 4.60
Observations 624,174 7,978 11,955 7,861
The sample includes pooled 9th grade cohorts from 2006-2012. Treatment students are students attending a charter school anytime
during 9th grade. The sample is restricted to students observed in both 8th and 9th grade that did not repeat a grade. Standardized
percent bias is calculated as 100 times the difference in sample means between the treated and comparison groups divided by the
square root of the average of the sample variances of the treated and comparison groups. Standardized percent bias greater than 10
in absolute value is considered unbalanced. Matching is based on Logit regression using up to 3 nearest neighbors within 0.01 of the
treatment propensity score and includes as predictors all demographic characteristics, achievement variables, local characteristics,
an indicator for charter 8th, and the interactions of charter 8th with demographic, achievement, and local characteristics.
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Table 2.3: Types of Student Moves Between 8th and 9th Grade
Frequency Percent
TPS 8th, TPS 9th 699,785 97.22
TPS 8th, CH HS 9th 1,245 0.17
TPS 8th, CH HS Combo 9th 1,777 0.25
CH Elem Combo 8th or Closing CH, TPS 9th 7,886 1.1
CH Elem Combo 8th or Closing CH, CH 9th 480 0.07
CH HS Combo 8th or CH Expanding to CH HS Combo, TPS 9th 1,994 0.28
CH HS Combo 8th or CH Expanding to CH HS Combo, CH 9th 6,663 0.93
Total 719,830 100
TPS stands for traditional public school, CH stands for charter school, and HS stands for high school. Elem
Combo is defined as a school serving grades within Kindergarten to 8. HS Combo is defined as a school with
a high grade at least 9 and low grade strictly below 9. The sample includes pooled 9th grade cohorts from
2006-2012. Treatment students are students attending a charter school anytime during 9th grade. The sample
is restricted to students observed in both 8th and 9th grade that did not repeat a grade.
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Table 2.4: High School Achievement Outcomes
English 1 (Standardized) ACT (Standardized) GPA (Weighted)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Charter 9th 0.110*** 0.032* 0.276*** 0.114*** 0.011 -0.090**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.025) (0.024) (0.048) (0.044)
Charter 9th (Entrants) 0.022 0.145*** -0.081*
(0.023) (0.035) (0.044)
Charter 9th (Stayers) 0.036* 0.105*** -0.094*
(0.019) (0.030) (0.052)
Charter 8th Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28,722 18,915 18,915 15,987 9,875 9,875 21,291 13,490 13,490
R-Squared 0.673 0.697 0.697 0.699 0.721 0.722 0.552 0.582 0.582
Treated N 7639 7534 7534 4407 4329 4329 4870 4773 4773
Comparison N 21083 11381 11381 11580 5546 5546 16421 8717 8717
Charter 9th is defined as any student observed in a charter school in 9th grade. Students observed in a charter school in 9th
grade can come from a traditional public school in 8th grade (Charter 9th Entrants) or a charter school in 8th grade (Charter 9th
Stayers). Including the control for being in a charter school in 8th grade in the third column for each outcome implies that Charter
9th Entrants are being compared to 9th grade traditional public school students that were not in a charter school in 8th grade.
Conversely, Charter 9th Stayers are being compared to 9th grade traditional public school students that were in a charter school
in 8th grade. Demographic control variables, achievement control variables, and local characteristics are included as covariates in
matching and OLS regressions, but the output is suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at the high school level. The letter a
indicates a statistically significant difference between the entrant and stayer effects at the 10% level.
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Table 2.5: High School Attainment Outcomes
Retained 9th Grade Graduate 4 Years Graduate 5 Years
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Charter 9th 0.004 0.004 -0.005 -0.009 0.000 -0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Charter 9th (Entrants) 0.016** -0.037*** -0.021
(0.007)a (0.012)a (0.013)a
Charter 9th (Stayers) -0.000 0.003 0.002
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
Charter 8th Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,879 19,816 19,816 28,314 18,790 18,790 21,466 14,644 14,644
Treated N 7967 7861 7861 7574 7471 7471 5720 5644 5644
Comparison N 21912 11955 11955 20740 11319 11319 15746 9000 9000
Charter 9th is defined as any student observed in a charter school in 9th grade. Students observed in a charter school in 9th
grade can come from a traditional public school in 8th grade (Charter 9th Entrants) or a charter school in 8th grade (Charter 9th
Stayers). Including the control for being in a charter school in 8th grade in the third column for each outcome implies that Charter
9th Entrants are being compared to 9th grade traditional public school students that were not in a charter school in 8th grade.
Conversely, Charter 9th Stayers are being compared to 9th grade traditional public school students that were in a charter school
in 8th grade. Demographic control variables, achievement control variables, and local characteristics are included as covariates in
matching and Logit regressions, but the output is suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at the high school level. The letter a
indicates a statistically significant difference between the entrant and stayer effects at the 10% level.
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Table 2.6: High School Achievement Outcomes - Robustness Checks
English 1 (Standardized) ACT (Standardized) GPA (Weighted)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Charter 9th (Entrants) 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.127*** 0.156*** -0.081* -0.081* -0.084* -0.083*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.039) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045)
Charter 9th (Stayers) 0.036* 0.035 -0.007 0.054** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.109** 0.103*** -0.094* -0.095* -0.092 -0.117*
(0.019) (0.022) (0.029) (0.024) (0.030) (0.034) (0.048) (0.034) (0.052) (0.053) (0.060) (0.061)
Charter 8th Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Restricted Matching Yes Yes Yes
Local Matching Yes Yes Yes
Non-Local Matching Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,915 17,841 11,206 17,281 9,875 9,255 5,851 8,971 13,490 12,642 8,214 12,130
R-Squared 0.697 0.700 0.695 0.699 0.722 0.733 0.721 0.729 0.582 0.592 0.580 0.592
Treated N 7534 7374 4631 7436 4329 4222 2696 4282 4773 4660 2853 4691
Comparison N 11381 10467 6575 9845 5546 5033 3155 4689 8717 7982 5361 7439
Charter 9th is defined as any student observed in a charter school in 9th grade. Students observed in a charter school in 9th grade can come from a traditional public school in 8th grade
(Charter 9th Entrants) or a charter school in 8th grade (Charter 9th Stayers). Including the control for being in a charter school in 8th grade implies that Charter 9th Entrants are being
compared to 9th grade traditional public school students that were not in a charter school in 8th grade. Conversely, Charter 9th Stayers are being compared to 9th grade traditional public
school students that were in a charter school in 8th grade. For each outcome, results are displayed for various matching methods. Restricted implies that charter 8th students that exit for
a TPS when they could have stayed in their 8th grade charter school for 9th grade are not available as possible matches. Local matching restricts potential matches to be from a TPS that
is one of the closest 5 TPSs to a charter school and within 15 miles of a charter school. Non-local matching restricts potential matches to be from a TPS that is not one of the closest 5
TPSs to a charter school or not within 15 miles of a charter school. Demographic control variables, achievement control variables, and local characteristics are included as covariates in
matching and OLS regressions, but the output is suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at the high school level. The letter a indicates a statistically significant difference between the
entrant and stayer effects at the 10% level.
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Table 2.7: High School Attainment Outcomes - Robustness Checks
Retained 9th Grade Graduate 4 Years Graduate 5 Years
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Charter 9th (Entrants) 0.016** 0.016** 0.017** 0.021*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.040*** -0.021 -0.021 -0.024** -0.021
(0.007)a (0.007)a (0.007) (0.007)a (0.012)a (0.012)a (0.011) (0.012)a (0.013)a (0.013)a (0.011) (0.013)a
Charter 9th (Stayers) -0.000 -0.004 0.014** -0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.022* 0.005 0.002 0.005 -0.019 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009)
Charter 8th Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Restricted Matching Yes Yes Yes
Local Matching Yes Yes Yes
Non-Local Matching Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,816 18,694 11,618 18,116 18,790 17,730 11,121 17,166 14,644 13,882 8,605 13,400
Treated N 7861 7699 4788 7761 7471 7318 4579 7376 5644 5569 3365 5569
Comparison N 11955 10995 6830 10355 11319 10412 6542 9790 9000 8313 5240 7831
Charter 9th is defined as any student observed in a charter school in 9th grade. Students observed in a charter school in 9th grade can come from a traditional public school in 8th grade
(Charter 9th Entrants) or a charter school in 8th grade (Charter 9th Stayers). Including the control for being in a charter school in 8th grade implies that Charter 9th Entrants are being
compared to 9th grade traditional public school students that were not in a charter school in 8th grade. Conversely, Charter 9th Stayers are being compared to 9th grade traditional public
school students that were in a charter school in 8th grade. For each outcome, results are displayed for various matching methods. Restricted implies that charter 8th students that exit for
a TPS when they could have stayed in their 8th grade charter school for 9th grade are not available as possible matches. Local matching restricts potential matches to be from a TPS that
is one of the closest 5 TPSs to a charter school and within 15 miles of a charter school. Non-local matching restricts potential matches to be from a TPS that is not one of the closest 5
TPSs to a charter school or not within 15 miles of a charter school. Demographic control variables, achievement control variables, and local characteristics are included as covariates in
matching and Logit regressions, but the output is suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at the high school level. The letter a indicates a statistically significant difference between the
entrant and stayer effects at the 10% level.
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Table 2.8: High School Achievement Outcomes - Student Ethnicity
English 1 (Standardized) ACT (Standardized) GPA (Weighted)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Charter 9th White 0.106*** 0.046** 0.291*** 0.127*** 0.015 -0.091
(0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.027) (0.054) (0.059)
Charter 9th Black 0.098*** 0.060** 0.138*** 0.108*** -0.029 -0.003
(0.024) (0.023) (0.039)a (0.041) (0.063) (0.058)
Charter 9th Hispanic 0.107** 0.047 0.234*** 0.096 0.030 -0.029
(0.046) (0.054) (0.074) (0.077) (0.084) (0.117)
Charter 9th Other 0.121*** 0.057 0.331*** 0.150** 0.012 -0.065
(0.024) (0.036) (0.067) (0.074) (0.061) (0.081)
Charter 9th (Entrants) White 0.034 0.140*** -0.105**
(0.026) (0.030) (0.047)
Charter 9th (Entrants) Black 0.035 0.117 -0.088
(0.039) (0.073) (0.056)
Charter 9th (Entrants) Hispanic 0.002 0.051 0.082
(0.069) (0.070)a (0.110)a
Charter 9th (Entrants) Other 0.061* 0.156 0.038
(0.032) (0.124) (0.082)a
Charter 9th (Stayers) White 0.050* 0.124*** -0.085
(0.026) (0.033) (0.070)
Charter 9th (Stayers) Black 0.073*** 0.105** 0.038
(0.028) (0.050) (0.070)
Charter 9th (Stayers) Hispanic 0.092 0.133 -0.140
(0.072) (0.128) (0.205)
Charter 9th (Stayers) Other 0.054 0.145* -0.161
(0.062) (0.084) (0.131)
Charter 8th Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30,020 18,653 18,653 16,641 9,723 9,723 22,374 13,572 13,572
R-Squared 0.674 0.690 0.690 0.704 0.724 0.724 0.560 0.593 0.594
Treated N 7982 7492 7492 4599 4363 4363 5134 4793 4793
Comparison N 22038 11161 11161 12042 5360 5360 17240 8779 8779
Charter 9th is defined as any student observed in a charter school in 9th grade. Students observed in a charter school in 9th grade
can come from a traditional public school in 8th grade (Charter 9th Entrants) or a charter school in 8th grade (Charter 9th Stayers).
Including the control for being in a charter school in 8th grade implies that Charter 9th Entrants are being compared to 9th grade
traditional public school students that were not in a charter school in 8th grade. Conversely, Charter 9th Stayers are being compared
to 9th grade traditional public school students that were in a charter school in 8th grade. Marginal treatment effects are calculated
over ethnic groups which implies that coefficients can be interpreted as the difference between treatment and comparison students
conditional on a particular ethnic group. For example, the first coefficient in column 3 is comparing white charter school students
not in a charter school in 8th grade (entrants) to white traditional public school students not in a charter school in 8th grade.
Demographic control variables, achievement control variables, and local characteristics are included as covariates in matching and
OLS regressions, but the output is suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at the high school level. Standard errors are clustered at
the high school level. The letter a indicates a statistically significant difference between the ethnic group relative to the white group
at the 10% level.
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Table 2.9: High School Attainment Outcomes - Student Ethnicity
Retained 9th Grade Graduate 4 Years Graduate 5 Years
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Charter 9th White -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Charter 9th Black 0.033** 0.027** -0.050** -0.026 -0.030* -0.014
(0.016)a (0.013)a (0.021)a (0.019) (0.017)a (0.018)
Charter 9th Hispanic -0.048*** -0.058*** 0.023 0.055 0.030 0.077*
(0.016)a (0.022)a (0.029) (0.040) (0.028) (0.041)a
Charter 9th Other -0.004 -0.009 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.012
(0.007) (0.011) (0.017) (0.025) (0.019) (0.030)
Charter 9th (Entrants) White 0.008 -0.029** -0.026**
(0.006) (0.013) (0.013)
Charter 9th (Entrants) Black 0.053** -0.093*** -0.064***
(0.021)a (0.024)a (0.023)a
Charter 9th (Entrants) Hispanic -0.083*** 0.008 0.074
(0.028)a (0.040) (0.051)a
Charter 9th (Entrants) Other -0.001 0.034 0.045
(0.011) (0.032)a (0.036)a
Charter 9th (Stayers) White -0.008* 0.014 0.013
(0.004) (0.011) (0.012)
Charter 9th (Stayers) Black 0.014 0.009 0.014
(0.012) (0.024) (0.024)
Charter 9th (Stayers) Hispanic -0.033 0.104* 0.082
(0.031) (0.061)a (0.067)
Charter 9th (Stayers) Other -0.017 -0.015 -0.017
(0.022) (0.033) (0.038)
Charter 8th Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 31,306 19,634 19,634 29,724 18,601 18,601 22,896 14,703 14,703
R-Squared 0.133 0.150 0.151 0.181 0.191 0.193 0.167 0.181 0.182
Treated N 8409 7898 7898 7981 7495 7495 6127 5756 5756
Comparison N 22897 11736 11736 21743 11106 11106 16769 8947 8947
Charter 9th is defined as any student observed in a charter school in 9th grade. Students observed in a charter school in 9th grade
can come from a traditional public school in 8th grade (Charter 9th Entrants) or a charter school in 8th grade (Charter 9th Stayers).
Including the control for being in a charter school in 8th grade implies that Charter 9th Entrants are being compared to 9th grade
traditional public school students that were not in a charter school in 8th grade. Conversely, Charter 9th Stayers are being compared
to 9th grade traditional public school students that were in a charter school in 8th grade. Marginal treatment effects are calculated
over ethnic groups which implies that coefficients can be interpreted as the difference between treatment and comparison students
conditional on a particular ethnic group. For example, the first coefficient in column 3 is comparing white charter school students
not in a charter school in 8th grade (entrants) to white traditional public school students not in a charter school in 8th grade.
Demographic control variables, achievement control variables, and local characteristics are included as covariates in matching and
Logit regressions, but the output is suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at the high school level. The letter a indicates a
statistically significant difference between the ethnic group relative to the white group at the 10% level.
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Table 2.10: High School Achievement Outcomes - Heterogeneity Based on Various Student Characteristics
English 1 (Standardized) ACT (Standardized) GPA (Weighted)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Charter 9th (Entrants) & Not Demo -0.004 0.020 0.012 0.104*** 0.145*** 0.126*** -0.093** -0.077* -0.099**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.045) (0.044) (0.048)
Charter 9th (Entrants) & Demo 0.054* 0.134 0.118** 0.192*** 0.076 0.319*** -0.054 -0.003 0.139**
(0.031)a (0.106) (0.049)a (0.046)a (0.128) (0.060)a (0.049) (0.180) (0.064)a
Charter 9th (Stayers) & Not Demo 0.011 0.034* 0.032* 0.091*** 0.103*** 0.109*** -0.064 -0.094* -0.097*
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.033) (0.030) (0.031) (0.045) (0.052) (0.055)
Charter 9th (Stayers) & Demo 0.064*** 0.204 0.073* 0.120*** 0.298** 0.058 -0.129** -0.117 -0.064
(0.023)a (0.127) (0.043) (0.035) (0.123) (0.069) (0.066)a (0.172) (0.071)
Charter 8th Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo = Male Yes Yes Yes
Demo = Limited English Proficient Yes Yes Yes
Demo = Disability Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,915 18,915 18,915 9,875 9,875 9,875 13,490 13,490 13,490
R-Squared 0.697 0.697 0.697 0.722 0.722 0.722 0.582 0.582 0.583
Treated N 7534 7534 7534 4329 4329 4329 4773 4773 4773
Comparison N 11381 11381 11381 5546 5546 5546 8717 8717 8717
Charter 9th is defined as any student observed in a charter school in 9th grade. Students observed in a charter school in 9th
grade can come from a traditional public school in 8th grade (Charter 9th Entrants) or a charter school in 8th grade (Charter 9th
Stayers). Including the control for being in a charter school in 8th grade implies that Charter 9th Entrants are being compared to
9th grade traditional public school students that were not in a charter school in 8th grade. Conversely, Charter 9th Stayers are being
compared to 9th grade traditional public school students that were in a charter school in 8th grade. Marginal treatment effects are
calculated over various student demographic characteristics that vary by column (male, limited English proficient, and disability)
which implies that coefficients can be interpreted as the difference between treatment and comparison students conditional on a
particular characteristic. For example, the first coefficient in column 1 is comparing female charter school students not in a charter
school in 8th grade (entrants) to female traditional public school students not in a charter school in 8th grade. Demographic control
variables, achievement control variables, and local characteristics are included as covariates in matching and OLS regressions, but
the output is suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at the high school level. The letter a indicates a statistically significant
difference between the demo group relative to the not demo group at the 10% level.
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Table 2.11: High School Attainment Outcomes - Heterogeneity Based on Various Student Characteristics
Retained 9th Grade Graduate 4 Years Graduate 5 Years
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Charter 9th (Entrants) & Not Demo 0.010 0.017** 0.013** -0.031** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.015 -0.022* -0.022*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
Charter 9th (Entrants) & Demo 0.022** -0.065** 0.037 -0.045*** 0.048 -0.038 -0.027* 0.078 -0.010
(0.010) (0.030)a (0.024) (0.017) (0.063) (0.029) (0.015) (0.068) (0.029)
Charter 9th (Stayers) & Not Demo -0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.011 0.002 -0.001 -0.013 0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Charter 9th (Stayers) & Demo 0.003 -0.194*** -0.005 0.018 0.068 0.044 0.018 0.075 -0.012
(0.007) (0.053)a (0.020) (0.013)a (0.082) (0.039) (0.011)a (0.104) (0.032)
Charter 8th Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo = Male Yes Yes Yes
Demo = Limited English Proficient Yes Yes Yes
Demo = Disability Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,685 19,685 19,685 18,790 18,790 18,790 14,644 14,644 14,644
Treated N 7802 7802 7802 7471 7471 7471 5644 5644 5644
Comparison N 11883 11883 11883 11319 11319 11319 9000 9000 9000
Charter 9th is defined as any student observed in a charter school in 9th grade. Students observed in a charter school in 9th
grade can come from a traditional public school in 8th grade (Charter 9th Entrants) or a charter school in 8th grade (Charter 9th
Stayers). Including the control for being in a charter school in 8th grade implies that Charter 9th Entrants are being compared to
9th grade traditional public school students that were not in a charter school in 8th grade. Conversely, Charter 9th Stayers are being
compared to 9th grade traditional public school students that were in a charter school in 8th grade. Marginal treatment effects are
calculated over various student demographic characteristics that vary by column (male, limited English proficient, and disability)
which implies that coefficients can be interpreted as the difference between treatment and comparison students conditional on a
particular characteristic. For example, the first coefficient in column 1 is comparing female charter school students not in a charter
school in 8th grade (entrants) to female traditional public school students not in a charter school in 8th grade. Demographic control
variables, achievement control variables, and local characteristics are included as covariates in matching and Logit regressions, but
the output is suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at the high school level. The letter a indicates a statistically significant
difference between the demo group relative to the not demo group at the 10% level.
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Table 2.12: High School Achievement Outcomes - Heterogeneity Based on Various School Characteristics
English 1 (Standardized) ACT (Standardized) GPA (Weighted)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Charter 9th (Entrants) & Not Char 0.065** 0.035 0.036 0.203*** 0.150* 0.329*** 0.028 -0.142* -0.086
(0.028) (0.045) (0.076) (0.070) (0.078) (0.106) (0.063) (0.082) (0.089)
Charter 9th (Entrants) & Char 0.024 0.032 0.031 0.018 0.155*** 0.139*** -0.145 -0.039 -0.074
(0.042) (0.024) (0.029) (0.075) (0.040) (0.047) (0.093) (0.049) (0.063)
Charter 9th (Stayers) & Not Char -0.023 0.030 0.040 0.141 0.045 0.014 -0.032 -0.286 -0.148*
(0.088) (0.038) (0.030) (0.097) (0.074) (0.069) (0.082) (0.193) (0.080)
Charter 9th (Stayers) & Char -0.026 0.070** 0.074** -0.175** 0.112** 0.125** 0.022 0.005 -0.023
(0.051) (0.027) (0.033) (0.072)a (0.049) (0.049)a (0.098) (0.051) (0.082)
Charter 8th Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Char = Combo Yes Yes Yes
Char = Old Yes Yes Yes
Char = High White Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,880 16,419 16,419 6,742 8,737 8,737 8,228 11,657 11,657
R-Squared 0.753 0.693 0.693 0.770 0.720 0.721 0.660 0.581 0.578
Treated N 6970 7426 7426 4302 4336 4336 4378 4681 4681
Comparison N 4910 8993 8993 2440 4401 4401 3850 6976 6976
Charter 9th is defined as any student observed in a charter school in 9th grade. Students observed in a charter school in 9th grade
can come from a traditional public school in 8th grade (Charter 9th Entrants) or a charter school in 8th grade (Charter 9th Stayers).
Including the control for being in a charter school in 8th grade implies that Charter 9th Entrants are being compared to 9th grade
traditional public school students that were not in a charter school in 8th grade. Conversely, Charter 9th Stayers are being compared
to 9th grade traditional public school students that were in a charter school in 8th grade. Combo indicates a school serves grade
levels outside 9 through 12. Old indicates that a school is strictly more than 7 years old. High White indicates that a school serves a
higher proportion of white students than the average public school in North Carolina. Marginal treatment effects are calculated over
various school characteristics that vary by column (Combo, Old, High White) which implies that coefficients can be interpreted as
the difference between treatment and comparison students conditional on a particular characteristic. For example, the first coefficient
in column 1 is comparing non-combo 9th grade charter school students not in a charter school in 8th grade (entrants) to non-combo
9th grade traditional public school students not in a charter school in 8th grade. Demographic control variables, achievement control
variables, and local characteristics are included as covariates in matching and OLS regressions, but the output is suppressed. Standard
errors are clustered at the high school level. The letter a indicates a statistically significant difference between the char group relative
to the not char group at the 10% level.
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Table 2.13: High School Attainment Outcomes - Heterogeneity Based on Various School Characteristics
Retained 9th Grade Graduate 4 Years Graduate 5 Years
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Charter 9th (Entrants) & Not Char 0.006 0.023** 0.071* -0.032 -0.076*** -0.100*** -0.028 -0.035** -0.046
(0.010) (0.011) (0.036) (0.026) (0.016) (0.032) (0.033) (0.015) (0.038)
Charter 9th (Entrants) & Char -0.030 0.020** 0.014** 0.102*** -0.034*** -0.039*** 0.108*** -0.026* -0.028*
(0.025) (0.010) (0.007)a (0.032)a (0.013) (0.015)a (0.035)a (0.015) (0.015)
Charter 9th (Stayers) & Not Char -0.001 0.007 0.039** 0.002 -0.033* -0.023 0.022 -0.032 -0.016
(0.011) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.019) (0.024) (0.014) (0.022) (0.021)
Charter 9th (Stayers) & Char -0.038** -0.005 -0.015** 0.142*** 0.014 0.015 0.109*** 0.012 0.013
(0.017)a (0.009) (0.007)a (0.040)a (0.012)a (0.012) (0.036) (0.010) (0.011)
Charter 8th Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Char = Combo Yes Yes Yes
Char = Old Yes Yes Yes
Char = High White Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,563 17,087 17,193 11,978 16,313 16,313 9,230 12,458 12,458
Treated N 7247 7694 7751 6888 7369 7369 5074 5510 5510
Comparison N 5316 9393 9442 5090 8944 8944 4156 6948 6948
Charter 9th is defined as any student observed in a charter school in 9th grade. Students observed in a charter school in 9th grade
can come from a traditional public school in 8th grade (Charter 9th Entrants) or a charter school in 8th grade (Charter 9th Stayers).
Including the control for being in a charter school in 8th grade implies that Charter 9th Entrants are being compared to 9th grade
traditional public school students that were not in a charter school in 8th grade. Conversely, Charter 9th Stayers are being compared
to 9th grade traditional public school students that were in a charter school in 8th grade. Combo indicates a school serves grade
levels outside 9 through 12. Old indicates that a school is strictly more than 7 years old. High White indicates that a school serves a
higher proportion of white students than the average public school in North Carolina. Marginal treatment effects are calculated over
various school characteristics that vary by column (Combo, Old, High White) which implies that coefficients can be interpreted as
the difference between treatment and comparison students conditional on a particular characteristic. For example, the first coefficient
in column 1 is comparing non-combo 9th grade charter school students not in a charter school in 8th grade (entrants) to non-combo
9th grade traditional public school students not in a charter school in 8th grade. Demographic control variables, achievement
control variables, and local characteristics are included as covariates in matching and Logit regressions, but the output is suppressed.
Standard errors are clustered at the high school level. The letter a indicates a statistically significant difference between the char
group relative to the not char group at the 10% level.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECTS OF CHARTER SCHOOLS ON TRADITIONAL PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS IN
NORTH CAROLINA
3.1 Introduction
Charter schools are privately run public schools with open enrollment policies, and have significant flexibil-
ity in the use of funding, hiring practices, and curriculum choice compared to traditional public schools. The
charter school model is based on the principle that schools should be held accountable for student success while
having the freedom to innovate and adjust learning environments. National growth in the charter sector, since
its inception in 1992, to over seven percent of all public schools in 2016 has raised concerns over the students
left behind, particularly disadvantaged students. Proponents of charter schools often argue that increased com-
petition will induce traditional public schools to increase productivity while opponents worry that charters may
drain traditional public school resources and talent. Implicit in these arguments is that effects on traditional pub-
lic school students may depend on the relative achievement of charter and traditional public schools, which has
largely been ignored in the literature. In North Carolina, between 1997 and 2005 (period 1), charter schools en-
rolled lower-achieving students relative to nearby traditional public schools, but between 2006 and 2016 (period
2) enrolled more white and higher-achieving students, which supports concerns over disadvantaged students left
behind. In order to understand the effects of this new generation of charter schools, this paper evaluates whether
competitive effects differ by the relative achievement of charter and traditional public schools, and whether
disadvantaged students are differentially affected.
Competitive pressure is an often cited mechanism through which charter schools can affect traditional public
school students, and it stems from two sources. First, students lost to charter schools decrease traditional public
school district revenue because state and local per pupil allotments are transferred from districts to charters. Lost
revenue may result in staffing reductions, program cuts, or school shutdown which implies a financial incentive
for traditional public schools that are not overcrowded to keep students. Overcrowded schools might not face
the same financial incentive, and possibly benefit from the opening of charter schools that save districts the cost
of a new school.
Second, charter schools may skim higher-performing students or teachers from traditional public schools.
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This might increase difficulty in attaining desired achievement levels or meeting accountability standards which
implies an academic incentive for traditional public schools to retain talented teachers and students. This in-
centive may be stronger for schools facing competition from charter schools with relatively higher average
lagged student test scores that may recruit high-quality teachers and students from traditional public schools. In
response to these competitive pressures, traditional public schools can possibly re-allocate resources, cut inef-
ficient teachers or programs, induce staff to increase productivity, or improve school-family connections.1 In
turn, these steps might have positive effects on student achievement in traditional public schools.
Even absent a response to competitive pressure, traditional public school students might be affected by
charter schools through a re-allocation of students, teachers, and funding. If higher or lower-achieving students
sort into charter schools, there may be negative or positive peer effects on students in traditional public schools.
Similarly, if higher or lower-performing teachers sort into charter schools, there may be negative or positive
teacher effects on students in traditional public schools.2 These effects may be exacerbated by higher-achieving
charters if they have recruited higher-performing students and teachers from traditional public schools. Finally,
the financial effect is ambiguous depending on the overcrowdedness of the district. Because of these different
mechanisms, the overall competitive effect is an empirical question.
There are two primary challenges when estimating the effects of charter schools on students in traditional
public schools. First, competitive effects may be confounded by student selection. For example, in a school level
analysis, if higher-achieving students select into charter schools, average traditional public school achievement
goes down regardless of any competitive effects.3 Second, charter school location may be based on unobservable
traditional public school characteristics that are also related to student achievement. For example, charter schools
may locate near high-quality traditional public schools. Even if there is no competitive effect, a failure to account
for endogenous locational decisions creates upwardly biased estimates because traditional public school quality
is positively correlated with proximity to a charter school and student achievement.
1Ericson et al. (2001) survey district administrators in a non-random sample of 49 districts across 5 states in 1999 and find, in
response to charters, some districts form specialty schools, implement gifted or at-risk programs, after school programs, specialized
curriculum, or parental involvement activities. Administrators report tracking students that leave for charters and comparing student
achievement with charters. Zimmer and Buddin (2009) survey traditional public school principals in California in 2002 and find that
20% of principals who indicate students in their local attendance area attend a charter change at least one of the following: teacher
compensation, teacher hiring/firing/discipline policies, curriculum, instructional practices, or professional development.
2Carruthers (2012) and Jackson (2012) find that teachers who move from traditional public to charter schools in North Carolina are
less effective in terms of value added and have weaker credentials.
3Researchers are primarily concerned with the effect of charter schools on students in traditional public schools (TPS), but the effect
on average TPS achievement is not without policy relevance. For example, state accountability standards are not adjusted based on
the competitive environment. Since 2014 in North Carolina, schools have been given a performance grade that is based on school
achievement (80%) and student growth (20%). Since the grade is largely based on achievement, a loss of high-achieving students to
charters has a negative effect on the performance grade even if the TPS remains just as efficient in terms of growth.
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Empirically, I model student test score gains as a function of competition and control for student-school spell
fixed effects in order to account for the most likely contributors to the endogeneity of measures of competition.4
Spell fixed effects account for student selection based on time-invariant student or family characteristics which is
preferable to studies utilizing alternative strategies relying on school-level data, which may suffer from student
selection bias (Holmes et al. 2003; Hoxby 2003; Bettinger 2005; Ni 2009). Spell fixed effects also account for
the non-random location of charter schools based on time-invariant characteristics.
I contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, I assess whether effects vary based on the relative
achievement of charter and traditional public schools. Cremata and Raymond (2014) and Cordes (2018) allow
effects to vary based on charter school achievement, but do not measure achievement relative to competing tradi-
tional public schools. Relative achievement is central because the degree of competitive pressure and allocative
effects depend on the relationship between a traditional public school and competing charter schools. Addition-
ally, both papers focus on large urban centers which may limit external validity. Second, I contribute to studies
of charter schools in North Carolina by considering the new generation of charters which differ substantially
from those that have been studied, given the shift toward higher-achieving students (Holmes et al. 2003; Bifulco
and Ladd 2006; Mehta 2017; Jinnai 2014; Gao and Semykina 2017).
Third, I implement two strategies to test whether spell fixed effects alleviate endogeneity concerns. The first
strategy includes school-specific linear trends in estimation to allow for the possibility that charter schools locate
based on underlying trends in achievement. This adds to the literature that employs spell fixed effect models but
does not control for trends (Sass 2006; Bifulco and Ladd 2006; Booker et al. 2008; Zimmer et al. 2009; Zimmer
and Buddin 2009; Winters 2012; Jinnai 2014). The second strategy exploits the timing of the charter school
applications and uses lagged school achievement and other lagged school characteristics to capture relevant
shocks to traditional public schools at the time of application. The timing and arduous nature of the application
process make it likely that charter schools locate based on persistent unobservable characteristics, but locating
based on time-varying shocks is possible. These two strategies are particularly useful because instrumental
variables that are robust to time-varying unobservable confounders are difficult to obtain, and my evidence
suggests that panel models may be sufficient.5 Fourth, I bound competitive estimates by estimating effects over
a range of persistence parameter values between zero and one. This relaxes the implausible assumption often
4A student-school spell fixed effect is defined as the set of observations for a student while at a particular school. Spell fixed effects
are an alternative to controlling separately for school and student fixed effects. For example, demeaning with respect to a spell fixed
effect is an alternative to explicitly including hundreds of school dummy variables in a regression and demeaning with respect to student
fixed effects.
5Several papers utilize instrumental variable estimation in order to account for selection on time-varying unobservables (Bettinger
2005; Imberman 2011b; Gao and Semykina 2017).
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maintained in the literature that what a student learned in the previous year is fully retained in the current year.67
If this assumption fails and lagged achievement is correlated with competition, estimates will be biased. I also
utilize dynamic panel models that estimate the persistence parameter as a comparison to my main results.
Results show that charter schools have no economically significant effect on math or reading test scores.
However, charter schools with higher average lagged student achievement than traditional public schools have
small positive effects on traditional public school students while lower-achieving charter competition has zero
to small negative effects. This indicates that differences in relative charter and traditional public school achieve-
ment across settings may partially explain why the literature has found divergent results. Higher-achieving
competition differentially benefits Hispanic and economically disadvantaged students in math relative to their
counterparts, which reduces achievement gaps. Lower-achieving competition differentially hurts Hispanic, eco-
nomically disadvantaged, limited English proficient, and disabled students in reading relative to their counter-
parts, which augments achievement gaps. This suggests that, contrary to the concerns of charter school critics,
charter competition and even higher-achieving charter competition does not negatively affect traditional public
school students. Estimates are insensitive to the inclusion of school trends, lagged school achievement and other
lagged school characteristics, which suggests that spell fixed effects may be adequate to control for endogeneity
concerns. Estimates are sensitive to the persistence assumption with effects weakening in magnitude with lower
persistence; however, the sign and significance of effects is almost always preserved between high and low per-
sistence values. Additionally, dynamic panel estimation generally yields persistence values greater than 0.5, and
competitive effect estimates largely reflect the results from my main estimation strategy.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the construction of the competition mea-
sures and summarizes the data. Section 3.3 discusses the empirical model, endogeneity concerns, and robustness
checks. Section 3.4 provides the main empirical results and results of the robustness checks. Section 3.5 con-
cludes.
3.2 Data
The North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI) collects administrative data on all students
in North Carolina public schools, and this information is made available through the North Carolina Educa-
tion Research Data Center (NCERDC). Individual students are linked across years and linked to teachers and
schools. The data contains student demographic information including sex, race, limited English proficiency,
economically disadvantaged status, disability status, and academically gifted status. In addition, North Carolina
6Zimmer and Buddin (2009) assume the opposite extreme - that there is no persistence in test scores.
7Booker et al. (2008) acknowledge these concerns.
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requires end of grade exams in grades 3 through 8 for all students in math and reading. Test scores are reported in
developmental scale scores and are designed to measure a student’s growth in math and reading comprehension
as he or she progresses through school. In order to account for differential scales across years and grades, and
to ease interpretation, math and reading test scores are standardized by grade-year.8 School level data files from
NCDPI contain latitudes and longitudes for charter and traditional public schools in North Carolina. I link each
traditional public school to every charter school and calculate distances between each pair to create distance
based measures of competition.9
3.2.1 Time Periods
I consider two time periods: period 1 (1997-2005) and period 2 (2006-2016). The cut-off year is chosen
as 2006 because the majority of previous studies in North Carolina are restricted to time periods before 2006.
Additionally, charter schools in period 1 differ substantially in size and student composition from those in period
2. This relates to competitive mechanisms such as the degree of competitive pressure a traditional public school
faces and allocative effects resulting from non-random teacher and student sorting between schools. Therefore,
I extend the literature examining North Carolina charter schools by analyzing this new generation of charter
schools in period 2.
3.2.2 Measures of Competition
Attrition Measures
One of the main challenges facing an empirical analysis of competitive effects is identifying reliable mea-
sures of which traditional public schools are competing with charter schools. Perhaps the strongest measure is
the attrition rate to charter schools. This measure of competition is less common in the literature, but is used by
Cremata and Raymond (2014) and Winters (2012). I define the traditional public school attrition rate as the num-
ber of students that non-structurally switch from the traditional public school to any charter school before the
begining of the current year divided by the traditional public school’s prior enrollment. The analysis is restricted
to schools serving grades 3 through 8 so attrition rates are restricted to student moves between those grades. I
define non-structural switchers as students that switch schools when they could have stayed an additional year
at their prior school.10 In order to account for potential non-linearities in competitive effects, the main attrition
8I conduct standardization by subtracting the average score for a particular grade-year and dividing by the standard deviation of
scores in that grade-year. Standardized test scores within grade-year have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Charter school
students are included in the standardization.
9See Appendix A for more details on the geocoding process.
10Some students move residence which implies a traditional public school may be counted as competing with a charter school many
miles away. In order to limit this problem, attrition rates are only calculated based on students that switch schools within 20 miles of one
another. This restriction excludes 5% of non-structural student moves from traditional public schools to charter schools.
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competition measures are dummy variables for attrition rates strictly greater than 0 and less than or equal to 1%,
and attrition rates strictly greater than 1%.11 This also allows effects to vary based on the degree of competition.
I define school-year observations with zero percent attrition as not competing, and this is the omitted category
in the analysis. Table 3.1 defines the main set of competition measures used throughout this paper.
Distance Measures
In addition to attrition measures of competition, I construct several distance based measures that count the
number of charter schools within a certain radius of a traditional public school. Distance based measures of
competition must strike a balance; a larger distance band may include schools that are not competing in the
treatment group, and a small band may exclude some schools that do compete. Overall, 75% of non-structural
student moves from traditional public to charter schools are less than 10 miles apart which implies schools farther
than 10 miles from a charter are unlikely to face a significant degree of competition. Based on this information,
I construct distance measures of competition using a maximum 10 mile radius.
There is an additional complication because students switching to charters in urban areas travel smaller
distances than in rural areas. The first row of Table 3.2 shows that in urban areas the median distance between
schools for students making non-structural moves from a traditional public school to a charter school is 4.25
miles while in rural areas it is 7.81. In order to account for this, I add the restriction that competing traditional
public schools be one of the closest 10 traditional public schools to a charter. In practice, this allows the distance
band defining which schools compete to be flexible based on the density of schools in an area.12 The fifth
row of Table 3.2 shows the average distance of charter schools to the 10th nearest traditional public school by
urbanicity. The table shows that, on average, the 10th closest traditional public school to a charter in urban
areas is 4.4 miles, and in rural areas is 11.7 miles. With this in mind, I define distance based competition as
an indicator that is one if a traditional public school is within 10 miles of a charter school and is one of the 10
nearest traditional public schools to a charter.13 Several papers employ distance based measures of competition,
but do not allow distance bands to vary based on urbanicity (Bifulco and Ladd 2006; Booker et al. 2008; Sass
11This cutoff point is chosen to allow effects to vary based on the degree of competition while leaving enough observations in the high
attrition category to detect effects. Among traditional public schools facing attrition, 75% have attrition rates below 1%, and 25% have
attrition rates above 1%.
12Certain charter schools in urban areas are nearby a large number of traditional public schools. For example, one charter school in
an urban area in period 2 is within 5 miles of 69 traditional public schools. Allowing all of these schools into the treatment group would
give a large amount of weight to the effects of this one charter school.
13There is an added complexity because traditional public schools (TPSs) open and close. Then a TPS could move in and out of
treatment based on the closing and opening of other TPSs that are closer to the charter. In order to account for this, all restricted
measures of competition have the added restriction that if a TPS is ever one of the nearest 10 TPSs to a charter within a period, it is
always counted as one of the nearest 10 in that period.
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2006).
Attrition vs Distance Measures
I choose attrition measures of competition as the main competition measures because they are more likely
to correctly identify which schools are competing, and because they do not rely on arbitrary distance bands and
other restrictions as the distance measures do. However, traditional public schools not facing attrition, but nearby
charter schools, may still be affected if the threat of competition is enough to induce a competitive response.
Additionally, the impact of charter schools on traditional public school attrition may be large upon charter entry
and then taper in later years. This may result in attrition measures not considering a traditional public school as
competing even though it is still nearby a charter school. For these reasons, I show results using distance based
measures as a check. Additionally, specifications using attrition based measures of competition also control for
traditional public schools within 10 miles of a charter but not facing attrition as a check for whether distance
measures capture effects that attrition measures do not.
Relative Achievement Measures
One purpose of this paper is to assess whether competitive effects depend on the relative achievement of
traditional public and charter schools. In order to test this hypothesis, I create variables for both attrition and
distance competition measures to indicate if competing charter schools have higher average achievement than a
traditional public school. In the case of attrition, I define a traditional public school as competing with higher-
achieving charter schools if the average lagged standardized test scores of students in charter schools to which
the traditional public school students have attrited is greater than the average lagged standardized test scores of
students in the traditional public school.14 The charter school average is weighted by the number of attriters so
that charter schools competing more heavily with a traditional public school are given more weight. I construct
the relative achievement measures separately for math and reading. When math test scores are the dependent
variable of interest, I use the relative math achievement measures to define relative achievement. When reading
test scores are the dependent variable of interest, I use the relative reading achievement measures to define
relative achievement. I use a similar process for distance based measures except the charter school average is
taken over charter schools within a certain distance and is weighted by charter school membership.
14I use the lagged test scores of current students instead of the lagged school average because new charter schools do not have a
lagged school average. A portion of the identifying variation in the analysis comes from entering charter schools so it is useful to have
a measure of relative achievement that is available for traditional public schools competing with entering charter schools. This implies
that, for new charter schools, the measure of achievement is based solely on student test scores while at a different school.
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3.2.3 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are computed for period 1 and period 2 separately and are displayed in Panel A and B
of Table 3.3, respectively. Math and reading test scores are only available for grades 3 through 8, so the sample
is restricted to students in those grade levels. Columns 1 and 4 include traditional public schools that do not
face attrition to charter schools, columns 2 and 5 include traditional public schools that face attrition to charter
schools, and columns 3 and 6 include charter schools. Significant differences between groups within each
period are starred at the p < .05 level and are always relative to the attrition group (within panel comparisons).
Significant differences between the same group across time periods are lettered at the p < .05 level in Panel A
(between panel comparisons). The top half of the table weights statistics by school membership and the bottom
half does not.
In period 1 and period 2, schools not facing attrition do not statistically significantly differ in terms of math
and reading test scores compared to schools facing attrition. In both periods, schools facing attrition have higher
proportions of black, Hispanic, and gifted students, but lower proportions of white students than schools not
facing attrition. Additionally, traditional public schools facing attrition have higher enrollment and are more
likely to be urban middle schools than traditional public schools not facing attrition. This indicates that schools
facing attrition and those not differ along several observable dimensions possibly correlated with achievement,
which implies they should be controlled in the analysis.
The characteristics of charter schools relative to traditional public schools facing attrition in each period
are more striking. Period 1 charters have lower math and reading test scores than competing traditional public
schools, but period 2 charters have higher math and reading scores. In terms of ethnicity, period 1 charters
relative to competing traditional public schools are relatively balanced although Hispanic students are under-
represented in charters. Period 2 charters are significantly more likely to be white and less likely to be Hispanic
than competing traditional public schools. In both periods, charters have lower proportions of limited English
proficient students, and period 2 charters have lower proportions of disabled students than competing traditional
public schools.15 Overall, charter schools have lower enrollment than competing traditional public schools and
are more likely to offer grade levels spanning combinations of elementary, middle, and high school grades.
So far I have made comparisons within Panel A and Panel B of Table 3.3, but it is also useful to compare
charter schools across time periods (columns 3 and 6). Significant differences between time periods for charter
schools are marked with the letter, a, in Panel A. Period 1 charters have significantly lower test scores in math
15There is some concern about charter school reporting of academically gifted and free lunch eligible students so these measures
should not be compared between traditional public and charter schools.
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and reading than period 2 charters. They also have lower proportions of Hispanic and limited English proficient
students. Urbanicity does not differ between periods, but charters in period 1 are significantly smaller than those
in period 2.16
In order to further explore how the relative achievement of charter schools has shifted over time, Table 3.4
gives the proportion of traditional public schools that are competing with lower or higher-achieving charters for
both math and reading by period. The first row shows that 32% of period 1 traditional public schools facing
attrition have lower average lagged student math scores than charter schools to which the traditional public
school students attrite. By period 2, 55% have lower achievement than competing charters. A similar pattern
emerges in reading with 49% of traditional public schools facing competition from higher-achieving charter
schools in period 1, and 66% in period 2. This indicates that, in both math and reading, traditional public
schools are more likely to face higher-achieving competition in period 2 than in period 1. If competitive effects
depend on relative achievement, this shift may result in differential effects between periods.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Empirical Model
I use a value added model of student test scores in math and reading to estimate the effects of charter
schools on traditional public school student achievement. Current traditional public school student test scores
are modeled as a function of lagged test scores which serve as a proxy for unobserved historical school and
family inputs for a student.17 The lagged value added model of achievement is given by
qijt = β0 + λqij,t−1 + cjtβ1 +wijtβ2 + xj,t−1β3 + µi + γj + θt + φjt+ ijt, (3.1)
where qijt is either standardized math or reading test score for student i in school j at time t. The vector
cjt includes measures of competition, wijt is a vector of contemporaneous student and school-level control
variables, xj,t−1 is a vector of lagged school-level control variables, µi is student unobserved heterogeneity,
γj is school unobserved heterogeneity, θt is year-grade unobserved shocks, φjt is a school specific linear time
trend, and ijt is an idiosyncratic error. I assume that measures of competition cjt may be correlated with both
student and school heterogeneity.
16This is because charter schools that opened in period 1 grew significantly in terms of enrollment by period 2, and because the initial
enrollment of opening charter schools is much higher in period 2 than in period 1.
17See Todd and Wolpin (2003) for a detailed derivation. In order for lagged test scores to serve as an appropriate proxy, it is assumed
that the education production function does not change over time, that the effect of inputs declines as the distance in time from current
achievement increases, and that the rate of decline is uniform across inputs.
52
Equation 3.1 can not be consistently estimated using fixed effect or first difference estimation to remove
student heterogeneity without further assumptions. For example, fixed effect estimation, depending on the
approach, implicitly or explicitly time demeans all variables with respect to each cross-section. The new time
demeaned error (ijt − ¯i) is correlated with time demeaned lagged achievement (qij,t−1 − q¯i) because ¯i is a
function of ij,t−1 which is correlated with qij,t−1 by construction. Additionally, q¯i is a function of qijt for all t
and so is correlated with both ijt and ¯i. In order to avoid this problem, I assume that persistence in achievement
is one (λ = 1) and write a gains-score model as
∆qijt = β0 + cjtβ1 +wijtβ2 + xj,t−1β3 + µi + γj + θt + φjt+ ijt. (3.2)
Without lagged achievement on the right hand side, standard fixed effect or first difference estimation can be
applied to remove student heterogeneity. Controlling for student and school fixed effects addresses many factors
that may bias estimates of the effect of competition on student test scores. The primary endogeneity concern
comes from the non-random location of charter schools that may be correlated with unobserved traditional public
school characteristics that are also correlated with achievement. I include school fixed effects to control for any
fixed unobservable school characteristics correlated with charter school location. This removes bias from fixed
unobservables such as charter location decisions made based on relatively constant factors such as urbanicity or
local school quality. Of secondary concern is that student school choice decisions may be based on unobservable
student characteristics that create a correlation between proximity to a charter school and these unobservables.
Student fixed effects control for any constant factors such as student ability or family characteristics that may be
correlated with competition.
I include time-varying control variables to account for factors at the student and school level that may be cor-
related with student achievement and competition. The contemporaneous control variables are an indicator for
being within 5 miles of a closing traditional public school, being within 5 miles of an opening traditional public
school, whether the school has increased its grade span, and whether a school has decreased its grade span.
I include these controls because charter school location may be correlated with restructuring in local school
districts, and shifting resources, teachers, and students may affect student achievement. Additional contempora-
neous control variables include an indicator for cohort student moves between schools, non-cohort moves, and
grade repetition. Charter school location may be correlated with student turnover in a local area and switching
schools may be associated with a drop in test scores.18 A cohort move is defined as a student switching schools
18Contemporaneous control variables may be viewed as mediators depending on the extent to which charter schools cause them.
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when at least 15% of his or her cohort in the previous school also made the same move. All other student moves
between schools are considered non-cohort. The one period lagged control variables are school enrollment,
proportions of disabled, limited English proficient, gifted, white, black, and Hispanic students which are meant
to control for school characteristics that are possibly correlated with charter school location and achievement. A
complete list of control variables with definitions is presented in Table 3.5.
Estimation of equation 3.2 is problematic because student effects, school effects, and linear trends enter the
model separately. One possibility is to time demean the model with respect to student effects and explicitly in-
clude school dummy variables and school dummy variables interacted with a linear time trend. This approach is
computationally infeasible because it requires the inclusion of thousands of covariates. Instead, I define student-
school spell effects as ψij = µi + λj . In the dummy variable context, a spell fixed effect could be eliminated
using the interaction of school and student dummy variables. First differencing or time demeaning with respect
to student-school spells greatly simplifies estimation. The use of spell fixed effects provides a consistent estima-
tor under strict exogeneity but is less efficient than including student and school effects separately.19 Because
of the large sample size, loss of precision is less of a concern, and in practice I do not have a problem detecting
effects. In order to additionally control for linear school trends, I first difference equation 3.2 with respect to
spell effects. This eliminates student and school heterogeneity, and because the first difference is with respect to
the student-school spell effect, linear trends reduce to school effects (φjt− φj(t− 1) = φj).
∆∆qijt = ∆cjtβ1 + ∆wijtβ2 + ∆xj,t−1β3 + ∆θt + φj + ∆ijt. (3.3)
Consistent estimation of equation 3.3 using pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) requires that cjt is uncorre-
lated with ij,t−1, ijt, and ij,t+1. I estimate whether results are robust to the inclusion of school trends, but I
report the main set of results using POLS on equation 3.3 omitting φj , and explicitly including the first differ-
enced grade-year dummy variables to eliminate ∆θt. In order to estimate equation 3.3 with trends, I estimate a
school fixed effect regression to remove φj . I am interested in how effects differ between periods so in practice
all control variables are interacted with a dummy variable for period 2, and school time trends are allowed to
vary by period. Finally, standard errors are clustered at the school level to account for correlation in error terms
For example, other school openings and closings, changing grade spans, or turnover could, to a certain degree, be caused by charter
schools and so these variables could be mediators. I am more concerned that charter schools choose to locate in areas with higher
turnover, closings, etc and so view these variables as confounds. I have purposely excluded school inputs as contemporaneous covariates
because these may respond to competition. For example, I exclude peer composition because charter schools may cause a shift in peer
composition and so peer characteristics mediate the charter school effect.
19 See Abowd et al. (1999) for a more detailed discussion.
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within schools.
Equation 3.3 makes it clear that only students with 2 consecutive non-missing test score gains will be in-
cluded in the estimation sample. Additionally, because first differences are taken with respect to student-school
spells, only two consecutive gains in the same school are valid. Between 1997 and 2016 about 4 million obser-
vations meet this criteria. The majority of traditional public schools in North Carolina follow traditional grade
spans with elementary (K through 5) and middle (6 through 8). A student in 6th grade in a middle school still
has a test score gain between 5th and 6th grade even if 5th grade was at a different school because I construct test
score gains without considering which school a student attends.20 This implies that the majority of students in
the estimation sample are in 5th grade, 7th grade, and 8th grade (about 95%) because these students potentially
have two test score gains while in the same school. Some 4th and 6th graders are also included in the estimation
sample because of grade repetition or because some traditional public schools serve non-traditional grade spans
with both elementary and middle grade levels.
Equation 3.3 also makes clear that identification of competitive effects relies on variation in cjt within a
student-school spell. Attrition and distance measures of competition may vary based on the opening, closing,
expanding, or moving of charter schools. For attrition, identification relies on students in schools facing attrition
in one period and not in another. About 30% of students with two valid test score gains in the estimation sample
experience variation between no attrition, 0-1% attrition, or >1% attrition. Identification does not come from
students moving from an area without a charter to an area with a charter because first differences are with
respect to a student while at a particular school. Identification of the effect of higher-achieving competition
relative to lower-achieving competition comes from changes in relative achievement within a student-school
over time even if the level of attrition does not vary. In other words, school level attrition can be constant and
the difference in competitive effects between higher and lower-achieving competition is still identified as long
as relative achievement changes over time.
3.3.2 Persistence
The perfect persistence assumption is unlikely to hold in student achievement because what a student learned
in the previous year is unlikely to be fully retained in the current year. If competition is correlated with lagged
achievement and λ is not one, the estimator for β1 will be inconsistent because a portion of lagged achievement
is effectively left in the error term.21 In order to account for this, I utilize persistence parameters in increments
20This is why controls are included in the model for student moves between schools. If student test score gains were constructed only
using observations for a student while at a particular school, there would be no need to control for student moves.
21If persistence is not one, imposing perfect persistence in a gain-score model leaves (λ− 1) proportion of lagged achievement in the
error term:qijt − qij,t−1 = β0 + cjtβ1 +wijtβ2 + xj,t−1β3 + µi + γj + θt + φjt+ [(λ− 1)qij,t−1 + ijt].
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of 0.01 from 0 to 1 and provide lower and upper bounded competition estimates based on these results. I report
main results assuming persistence of one, and secondary results assuming alternative persistence values.
An alternative strategy is to leave lagged achievement on the right hand side and estimate equation 3.1
using an Arellano-Bond approach. In order to implement this strategy, the equation includes school dummy
variables and is first differenced with respect to student fixed effects. By construction, first differenced lagged
achievement is correlated with the first differenced error term. In order to account for this endogeneity, further
lags of achievement are used as instruments for first differenced lagged achievement. The main concern with
this approach is that the second lag of achievement, which is commonly used as an instrument, is likely to be
endogenous because of measurement error in test scores and autocorrelation in the error term. To avoid this
problem, the third or later lag of achievement can be used as the instrument, but this is a heavy data requirement
and the third lag may be a weak instrument. Another alternative is to use alternative tests as instruments. For
example, twice lagged reading test scores can be used as an instrument for first differenced lagged math test
scores. This approach requires the assumption that shocks to math and reading test scores are uncorrelated
which seems unlikely to hold in practice. See Andrabi et al. (2011) for a more detailed discussion.
Although I do not report dynamic panel estimates as my main results because of sensitivity in estimation and
concern over identifying assumptions, I do report these estimates as a robustness check. Including school dummy
variables and first differencing with respect to student fixed effects using the dynamic panel approach is com-
putationally infeasible because of the size of my data. Instead, I first difference with respect to student-school
spell fixed effects. This implies that the persistence parameter is identified from students with 4 consecutive test
scores while in a particular school.22 I use thrice lagged math test scores, reading test scores, and school level
demographics as instruments.
3.3.3 Robustness Checks
The primary threat to identification after controlling for fixed unobservable student and school level con-
founders is based on unobservable trends or time-varying shocks correlated with competition and student achieve-
ment.
Trends
First, I check robustness to the inclusion of linear school trends. Including non-linear trends in estimation is
computationally demanding; instead, I allow linear trends to vary between periods. In estimation, this requires
22I also estimate models with school dummy variables first differencing with respect to student fixed effects on period 1 and period
2 separately and find results that are fairly similar. It was not possible to run these models on both periods at the same time because of
memory constraints.
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that I separately define two school fixed effects for the same school: one for period 1 and the other for period
2. If competition measures are biased by correlation with time-varying unobservable traditional public school
characteristics, we expect competitive effect estimates to be sensitive to the addition of school trends.
Time-Varying Unobservables
Unobserved shocks correlated with charter school location decisions are less of a concern because of the
charter school approval process. Considering the timing and length of the application process, it seems con-
servative to assume that the decision to apply likely responds to shocks that occurred two or more years before
the planned opening year but not one year before.23 For this to be a threat to my identification strategy, shocks
two or more years prior have to be correlated with current achievement and current measures of competition.
Fortunately, given the first difference estimation strategy, I can include school average student test score gains
lagged three periods in the model to capture lagged shocks. More specifically, write equation 3.2 with spell fixed
effects, but without school trends as
∆qijt = β0 + cjtβ1 +wijtβ2 + xj,t−1β3 + ψij + θt + [ζ¯j,t−3 + ˜ijt], (3.4)
where the error term is divided into an average lagged school component representing relevant shocks at the time
of application and an idiosyncratic student component (ijt = ζ¯j,t−3 + ˜ijt). Furthermore, aggregate equation
3.2, with spell fixed effects but without school trends, to the school level and lag three periods.
¯∆qj,t−3 = β0 + cj,t−3β1 + w¯j,t−3β2 + xj,t−4β3 + ψ¯j + θt−3 + ¯j,t−3. (3.5)
Then we can solve for ¯j,t−3 in equation 3.5 and plug into equation 3.4. In practice, this implies including thrice
lagged average student test score gains, thrice lagged school control variables, and thrice lagged competition
measures in estimation. The ψ¯j and θt−3 are subsumed by spell fixed effects and time effects in equation 3.4.
If shocks three periods ago are correlated with current charter school location and current achievement, the
addition of these lagged covariates may affect the competition estimates. Sensitivity of the estimate for β1 to
the addition of thrice lagged covariates may suggest that shocks near the time of application are relevant to test
scores at time t and correlated with current competition measures, which implies a biased competitive effect
23In North Carolina, the charter school application process is arduous and lengthy. Deadlines have varied across time, but in general
applications are due at least one year before a school opens. For a specific example, charter schools planning to open in the 2014-2015
school year had an application deadline of March 1, 2013. Additionally, letters of intent were due January 4, 2013 and a letter of intent
is required for the application to be considered.
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estimate.
Distance and Private School Controls
In addition to separately running specifications with distance based measures of competition, I also estimate
a specification that combines distance and attrition measures. There is some concern that traditional public
schools not facing attrition but nearby charter schools should be treated differently from schools not facing
attrition and not nearby charter schools. In order to account for this, I add an indicator to the main specification
using attrition measures of competition that is one for traditional public schools not facing attrition but within
10 miles of any charter school. This separately identifies the effect of traditional public schools nearby a charter
that are not facing attrition from traditional public schools facing attrition. Estimated effects are then relative to
the omitted category of schools that are not facing attrition and are not within 10 miles of any charter school.
Charter school entry, exit, and expansion may be correlated with the presence of private schools. It is
also possible that charter schools affect the opening and closing of private schools. I obtain private school
information from the National Center for Education Statistics Private School Universe Survey from 1996 to
2014. This survey is conducted every other year. It does not contain exact private school location information in
every year, but does always contain mailing city and zipcode. I convert mailing city and zipcodes to latitudes and
longitudes and compute distances between private schools and traditional public schools to construct indicators
for whether a traditional public school is within 5 miles of an opening or closing private school. These measures
are much cruder than my competition measures because the addresses are not physical addresses, addresses are
not at the street level, and the survey suffers from non-response. However, this is the only private school data
available, and I check the sensitivity of competition estimates to the inclusion of these private school control
variables.
Fixed Effect Estimation
First differences (FD) and fixed effect (FE) estimation methods are able to remove student and school het-
erogeneity combined into a student-school spell effect. First differences is the main estimation strategy used in
this paper; however, it is useful to compare FD estimates to FE estimates for the main set of results as a test of
strict exogeneity (Wooldridge 2010). If strict exogeneity is violated such that competition is correlated with ijt
from any time period, FD and FE estimators generally have different probability limits. Thus, large differences
between FD and FE estimates may suggest a violation of this assumption.
Distance Based Competition Measures
So far I have generally focused my discussion on the endogeneity of competition measures based on where
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charter schools locate which is appropriate for distance based measures of competition. Attrition, however, is
determined both by proximity to a charter and the decision of students to move to that charter. This adds an
additional concern for attrition based measures of competition because attrition rates may be correlated with
unobserved time-varying school characteristics. I compare results using distance and attrition based measures
of competition as a check of this potential source of bias.
Relative Achievement Instrumental Variable
Considering heterogeneity in competitive effects introduces another layer of challenge because relative
achievement measures of competition are a function of lagged student test scores, which introduces additional
endogeneity concerns. More specifically, the relative achievement measure for attrition is defined as
Hjt(q¯j,t−1) = 1[q¯j,t−1 < C¯Hj,t−1], (3.6)
which is an indicator that is one if the average lagged test scores of students in a traditional public school
are lower than the average lagged test scores of students in competing charter schools. The average lagged
achievement of students in traditional public school j at time t is defined as
q¯j,t−1 =
1
Njt
∑
i∈j,t
qi,t−1,
where qi,t−1 is the lagged standardized math or reading test score of student i in school j at time t whether or
not the student attended school j at time t− 1.
The average lagged student achievement of competing charter schools is defined as
C¯Hj,t−1 =
N1q¯1,t−1 + ...+NMjt q¯Mjt,t−1
N1 + ...+NMjt
.
The q¯m,t−1 are average lagged student test scores for charter school m competing with traditional public school
j (constructed in the same way as the traditional public school average). Charter schools are indexed by m and
run 1, ...,Mjt. The number of competitors Mjt can vary for traditional public school j at time t. For charter
competitors, the Nm is not charter school size but rather is the number of students that attrited from TPS j to
charter school m. Charter students are not in the estimation sample, but are used to construct average charter
school test scores for this competition measure.
Essentially, specifications that account for relative achievement include dummy variables for each level
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of attrition (0-1% or >1%), and interact these dummy variables with a dummy variable for facing higher-
achieving competition (Hjt(q¯j,t−1)). Consider the main estimating equation 3.3 but ignore school effects φj .24
In practice, results are insensitive to the inclusion of trends. Competition measures are first differenced, and I
have argued that attrition is uncorrelated with ij,t−1, ijt, and ij,t+1, which implies that first differenced attrition
is uncorrelated with ∆ijt from the estimating equation 3.3. However, the interactions with relative achievement
measures are correlated with the first differenced error through Hjt(q¯j,t−1) because relative achievement for
school j is a function of qi,t−1 for students i in school j at time t which is correlated with ij,t−1.
Whether or not the size of the correlation between relative achievement measures and the error is significant
depends on the dependence in ijt and how many observations we are averaging over for school j at time
t. If there are many students and errors are independent, the school average of achievement converges to a
deterministic value that is uncorrelated with ij,t−1. If schools on average are small, the error may be strongly
correlated with the average of lagged student achievement. Finally, if the errors are strongly correlated within
schools even a large number of students does not get rid of the correlation between q¯j,t−1 and ij,t−1. On average,
schools in the estimation sample have around 600 students so the main concern is the possibility that individual
errors are strongly correlated within school.
In order to test for this potential source of bias, I construct instruments that are uncorrelated with the error
term in equation 3.3 (φj + ∆ijt), but correlated with the first difference of relative achievement measures of
competition interacted with attrition dummy variables. The instruments are constructed using the lagged test
scores of students in school j at time t− 2. Student test scores lagged three periods are unlikely to be correlated
with the first differenced error unless there is significant serial correlation in the errors. More specifically the
instruments are interactions of attrition dummy variables with
Hjt(q¯j,t−3) = 1[q¯j,t−3 < C¯Hj,t−1], (3.7)
where
q¯j,t−3 =
1
Nj,t−2
∑
i∈j,t−2
qi,t−3.
The only difference between the instrumental variable and the competition measure is that the instrument is
based on a comparison of charter school achievement relative to the traditional public school lagged student test
24School fixed effects implicitly time demean all variables and the error term with respect to school averages. The IV strategy relies on
further lags of q¯jt−1 so including school fixed effects will introduce a correlation between the demeaned instrument and the demeaned
error in the first stage.
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scores from two periods ago rather than lagged test scores from the current period.25 Instruments enter in levels
in the first differenced estimating equation 3.3.
3.3.4 Heterogeneity by School Type
Competitive effects may vary based on the relative characteristics of charter and traditional public schools.
I have already defined the main relative achievement measures of competition, but I define an additional relative
achievement measure as an indicator that is one if competing charter schools have higher average lagged student
test scores than the district in which the traditional public school resides. This tests whether results are sensitive
to how broadly relative achievement is defined. I also define an indicator for whether charter schools competing
with a traditional public school have higher average lagged student test scores than other charter schools. This
measure does not depend on the relative achievement of traditional public schools, and tests whether this is
an important consideration. Finally, I also explore heterogeneity in treatment effects by defining indicators for
whether a traditional public school has lower proportions of white students, disabled students, or limited English
proficient students than competing charter schools.
3.3.5 Heterogeneity by Student Type
Effects may also vary based on the characteristics of individual students. For example, when faced with
higher-achieving competition, traditional public schools may focus more on moving lower-achieving students
into proficiency. On the other hand, the loss of higher-achieving students may induce traditional public schools
to shift effort and resources to these types of students in order to prevent further attrition. From the allocative
side, lower or higher-achieving charters may recruit certain types of teachers and students from traditional public
schools resulting in differential effects on disadvantaged students left behind. In order to explore these possi-
bilities, I interact competition measures with student ethnicity (black, Hispanic), limited English proficiency,
academically gifted status, disability status, and economically disadvantaged status. Considering the shift in
the charter school sector to serving more high-achieving white students, it is important to consider the spillover
effects on students traditionally more at-risk of academic failure left in traditional public schools.
3.3.6 School Level Effects
So far the analysis has been concerned with identifying the overall effect of charter schools on traditional
public school student test scores and how effects vary by school and student characteristics. This does not
25Charter school lagged student test scores may include the test scores of students in traditional public schools the period before
switching to a charter. Then charter school average lagged student achievement could be correlated with shocks at the traditional public
school in t − 1. Except for charter schools that just opened, the majority of student lags will not be from a traditional public school,
but from the charter school itself, which limits this concern. However, in the first year of operation charter school student lagged test
scores are solely based on traditional public schools. A later robustness check removes traditional public schools competing with charter
schools in their first year of operation from the analysis and indicates that this is not a concern.
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explain, however, the mechanisms through which charter schools may be affecting traditional public schools.
While it is difficult to identify if traditional public schools are actually responding to competition because of data
limitations, it is possible to explore several allocative mechanisms. Following the general set-up of the student
level models, I model the change in several school level covariates as a function of school level demographic
control variables and competition measures using school fixed effect estimation. The dependent variables of in-
terest include school membership, number of teachers, class size, proportion white, proportion black, proportion
Hispanic, proportion gifted, proportion disabled, proportion limited English proficient, and proportion econom-
ically disadvanted. I examine whether lower or higher-achieving charter competition differentially affects these
school level outcomes and whether any changes in these school level variables may explain effects on student
test scores.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Main Results
Table 3.6 presents the main results using attrition measures of competition. All specifications assume a
persistence parameter of one. Columns 1 through 3 present results for math test scores and columns 4 through
6 for reading. This table addresses whether effects depend on the relative achievement of charter and traditional
public schools and whether effects differ by period. Column 1 divides traditional public schools into those
facing 0-1% attrition (low), those facing attrition>1% (high), and those facing no attrition which is the excluded
category. Effects in column 1 are statistically insignificant and close to zero indicating no effect of competition
on math test scores.
Column 2 interacts the attrition measures from column 1 with indicators for whether the lagged student test
scores of the traditional public school are lower on average than the lagged student test scores of charter schools
to which the traditional public school students are attriting. Results indicate that students in traditional public
schools competing with lower-achieving charter schools relative to students in schools facing no attrition lose
-0.007 and -0.016 standard deviations in math test scores for 0-1% and >1% attrition levels, respectively. Alter-
natively, students in traditional public schools facing 0-1% attrition from higher-achieving charter schools gain
a statistically significant 0.027 standard deviations in math test scores relative to those facing lower-achieving
competition, and those facing>1% attrition gain 0.043 standard deviations. The effect of higher-achieving com-
petition relative to students in schools experiencing no attrition is 0.020 standard deviations for 0-1% attrition,
and 0.027 standard deviations for >1% attrition.
Column 3 additionally interacts the competition variables from column 2 with period 2 indicators to assess
whether effects vary by period. The first four rows are the effects in period 1 and indicate that lower-achieving
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charter competition has small, statistically insignificant negative effects while higher-achieving charter compe-
tition has positive effects around 0.025 standard deviations relative to students in schools facing no attrition.
The effect of lower-achieving competition in period 2 relative to students in schools facing no attrition, is the
sum of the coefficients in rows 1 and 2 and the coefficients in rows 5 and 6. This indicates there are slightly
more negative effects from >1% attrition from lower-achieving charters in period 2, around -0.026 standard
deviations, than in period 1. Finally, the effects from higher-achieving competition relative to no competition
in period 2 are the sum of all odd rows for attrition 0-1% and even rows for >1% attrition, and indicate small
positive effects from higher-achieving competition of 0.016 and 0.025 standard deviations for 0-1% and >1%
attrition, respectively. Overall, this suggests effects are similar between periods for math.
Column 4 of Table 3.6 displays results for reading test scores and indicates that students in traditional public
schools facing 0-1% attrition gain 0.004 standard deviations, and those facing more than 1% attrition gain 0.009
standard deviations relative to students in schools facing no attrition to charter schools. Although these effects
are statistically significant, effect sizes smaller than 0.01 standard deviations are not economically meaningful.
Column 5 shows that the small positive effects are driven by competition with higher-achieving charter schools.
Additionally, column 6 indicates that in both period 1 and period 2 higher-achieving competition has positive
effects in reading, and lower achieving competition has zero to small negative effects. The main difference in
reading is that effects from lower-achieving competition are slightly more negative in period 1 than in period 2.
Relative achievement effects in reading are slightly smaller in magnitude than math but reflect a similar pattern.
Overall, the main results suggest that higher-achieving charter competition has small positive effects in math and
reading, but overall effects are close to zero in math and reading. Because effects between periods are similar in
both math and reading, future tables will omit the period interactions and focus on relative achievement.
3.4.2 Persistence Results
The main set of results in Table 3.6 use a persistence parameter of one. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate
the effect of different persistence parameters on competitive effect estimates for math and reading test scores.
Estimates are displayed for the main relative achievement competition groups: attrition 0-1% lower-achieving
charter competition, attrition 0-1% higher-achieving charter competition, attrition >1% lower-achieving charter
competition, and attrition >1% higher-achieving charter competition. The x-axis is persistence values ranging
from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.01. The graph demonstrates that there is a strong linear relationship between
assumed persistence parameters and competition estimates with the premium to higher-achieving competition
increasing in magnitude with larger persistence values. However, the sign and significance of effects is generally
preserved regardless of the persistence value.
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Figure 3.1 and 3.2 also display the results from the dynamic panel estimators. The vertical line is the
persistence parameter value from this estimation procedure and the triangles represent the competitive effect
estimates where the solid black triangle corresponds to the sold black line and so on. Ideally, the dynamic panel
estimates (solid and dashed triangles) would exactly coincide with the main results (solid and dashed lines),
but they are very similar with the exception of the effect of lower-achieving charter competition on reading
test scores for the 0-1% attrition group. Overall, the dynamic panel results are similar to my main results and
persistence is estimated to be greater than 0.5 which lends some support to assuming perfect persistence. Finally,
Table 3.7 displays the coefficient estimates using my main estimation strategy assuming persistence of one in
columns 1 and 4, and persistence of zero in columns 2 and 5. The dynamic panel results are displayed in columns
3 and 6.
3.4.3 Robustness Check Results
Trend Results
I test for sensitivity to the inclusion of linear school trends because charter schools may locate based on
underlying trends in traditional public school achievement. Results for math and reading in column 2 of Table
3.8 and Table 3.9 with the inclusion of school trends are very similar to the main results displayed in column 1
of Table 3.8 and Table 3.9. This suggests that competition measures are not significantly biased by unobservable
trends in school achievement.
Time-Varying Unobservable Results
As discussed in Section 3.3.3, charter schools may respond to local shocks around the time of application.
If this is the case, estimates might be affected by the addition of thrice lagged school average student test score
gains, thrice lagged school characteristics, and thrice lagged competition measures as additional regressors.
Column 3 of Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 shows results for math and reading test scores with the inclusion of these
additional covariates and demonstrate that this is not a concern because estimates are largely unchanged.
Distance and Private School Control Results
Charter schools may affect or respond to the opening or closing of private schools in an area, and private
school openings and closings may also affect traditional public school student achievement. Column 5 of Table
3.8 and Table 3.9 presents results including private school controls and are very similar to column 1 without
private school controls. Interestingly, the private school coefficients are statistically significant and indicate that
closing private schools have very small negative effects on traditional public school student math and reading
test scores, and that opening private schools have small positive effects on reading test scores.
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Additionally, traditional public schools within 10 miles of a charter school that are not experiencing attrition
may still experience competitive effects. Column 4 of Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 presents results including an
indicator for students in schools within 10 miles of any charter but not facing attrition. The addition of this
indicator does not affect competition estimates, and is statistically insignificant and close to zero. This suggests
the attrition measures of competition are not missing competitive effects by excluding schools that are nearby
charter schools but not experiencing attrition.
Fixed Effect Estimation Results
Differences between fixed effect and first difference estimates may suggest a violation of strict exogeneity.
Results using spell fixed effects without controlling for school trends are presented in Table 3.10 and can be
compared to Table 3.6. Estimates are almost identical between methods and alleviate concern about violations
of strict exogeneity.
Distance Based Competition Measure Results
Distance based measures of competition serve as a useful check of bias in attrition measures due to student
schooling decisions based on local or school level shocks. Results using distance based measures are presented in
Table 3.11. As with attrition, there is a positive gap between effects from higher-achieving and lower-achieving
competition. Effect sizes are generally larger in magnitude using the distance based measures, but largely reflect
results using attrition which indicates that this is not a major concern.
Relative Achievement Instrumental Variable Results
As discussed in Section 3.3.3, relative achievement competition measures are possibly correlated with the
first differenced error term because I define relative achievement based on lagged student test scores which
are correlated with lagged error terms by construction. In order to test for the extent of this bias, instrumental
variables are constructed for relative achievement based on average lagged student test scores using twice lagged
average lagged student test scores, which are plausibly exogenous. Theoretically, when math is the outcome,
I could use two instruments constructed from twice lagged average lagged student test scores: one interacted
with attrition 0-1% and the other interacted with attrition >1%. However, I can also construct instruments based
on reading test scores. The specifications in Table 3.12 include all four instruments based on math and reading
interacted with the two attrition levels. This over-identifies the model and allows for tests of over-identifying
restrictions.
Before analyzing the coefficients, note that first stage F tests of the excluded instruments indicate that the
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instruments are strongly correlated with the endogenous variables. The Hansen J P-value is the p-value asso-
ciated with a test of the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The null is marginally not rejected
in the case of math (p=0.10) and not rejected in the case of reading (p=0.53). This does raise some suspicion
about the validity of the instruments in specifications with math as the dependent variable. However, the large
amount of data used in estimation and that this is not a strong rejection may alleviate concerns. Additionally,
the instruments may be identifying different local average treatment effects which would also cause a rejection
of the null.
The coefficient estimates in column 1 and 2 for math and reading largely reflect the premium associated
with higher-achieving competition. Estimates for attrition between 0-1% are slightly larger in magnitude when
compared to the main results. The largest difference comes from a sizable increase in the magnitude of effects
for attrition greater than 1%. In math, students in schools facing attrition >1% from lower-achieving charters
see a drop in gains of -0.055 standard deviations (compared to OLS of -0.007); among the IV results, this is
the largest deviation from the main results. Those facing higher-achieving charters see gains in math of 0.055
standard deviations (compared to OLS of 0.026), relative to schools with no attrition. In reading, the IV results
for attrition greater than 1% are also larger in magnitude than the main results, but to a lesser degree.
Although results are not displayed, I run specifications using variations of the instruments such as only
including instruments constructed from math scores in math regressions and using further lags of achievement
to construct the instruments. Results generally reflect those presented in Table 3.12. Overall, IV results suggest
that, if anything, bias in the OLS model is toward zero so that the main OLS estimates are understating the
true effect. Instrumental variable results are not reported as the main results because I can not include linear
trends in the IV models and because the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions is marginally passed in the
math specifications. Additionally, depending on the construction of the instruments, estimates are not always
statistically significantly different from zero in the reading IV specifications, although they are always greater in
magnitude than the OLS estimates.
3.4.4 Heterogeneity by School Type Results
Although I have shown effects depend on relative school achievement, it is possible that broader definitions
of relative achievement or relative school demographics are also important. Table 3.13 presents results for
various measures of relative charter and traditional public school achievement and demographics. Attrition
group dummy variables are interacted with indicators for whether competing charter schools have higher average
lagged student test scores than the twice lagged average lagged student test scores of the traditional public
school. Essentially this uses the instrumental variable for relative achievement developed in a prior section as the
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measure of competition. The relative achievement premium is reduced in math and eliminated in reading which
suggests that further lags of achievement are less relevant than current lags in constructing relevant achievement
measures. The next set of interactions use an indicator if competing charter school average lagged student
achievement is greater than the average lagged student achievement of the district in which the traditional public
school resides. For low levels of attrition, a relative achievement premium exists but is weakened relative to the
main results. This suggests that measuring achievement relative to the traditional public is more relevant than
measuring relative to the district.
Next, attrition levels are interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether a charter school has higher
average lagged student test scores than the average of all charter schools. This removes any relation to traditional
public schools and results show a small premium in math for the 0-1% attrition level, but all other groups have
no effect. Finally, attrition level dummy variables are interacted with indicators if competing charter schools
have higher proportion of white, disabled, or limited English proficient students than the traditional public
school. None of these interactions are statistically significant. Overall, these results suggest that heterogeneous
treatment effects are driven by differences in relative achievement, and that, although I find small effects using
different definitions of relative achievement, the largest effects are found using relative achievement based on
lagged student test scores which I use for the main set of results throughout this paper.
3.4.5 Heterogeneity by Student Type Results
As discussed in section 3.3.5, traditional public schools may respond to charter competition in ways that
differentially affect different types of students. Similarly, allocative effects from shifting students, teachers,
and resources may differentially affect different types of students. Table 3.14 presents results that interact
relative achievement measures of competition with student demographic characteristics. Rows 4-8 display the
interaction coefficients, but note that the variable definitions change with the column headings. For example,
columns 1 and 2 interact competition measures with an indicator if a student is black. Columns 3 and 4 interact
competition measures with an indicator if a student is Hispanic. In order to avoid the use of a triple interaction
term, the relative achievement interactions are replaced with group indicator variables for each combination
of attrition level and relative achievement: attrition 0-1% lower-achieving charter competition, attrition 0-1%
higher-achieving charter competition, attrition >1% lower-achieving charter competition, and attrition >1%
higher-achieving charter competition. These group indicators are then interacted with student demographics.
For math test scores, the interaction terms indicate that in general groups are very similar. The excep-
tions are higher gains for Hispanic and economically disadvantaged students relative to non-Hispanic and non-
economically disadvantaged students in schools facing 0-1% attrition from higher-achieving charter schools
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(columns 3 and 11). This suggest, at the least, that higher-achieving competition does not differentially hurt dis-
advantaged students left behind. In reading, Hispanic, limited English proficient, disabled, non-gifted, and eco-
nomically disadvantaged students experience more negative effects than their counterparts from lower achieving
competition. This suggests that achievement gaps for disadvantaged students are augmented in schools facing
lower-achieving charter competition. Additionally, the interaction terms range from -0.028 to -0.046 standard
deviations for Hispanic, limited English proficient, and economically disadvantaged students which are not
inconsequential. This indicates that higher-achieving competition does not negatively affect disadvantaged stu-
dents and may even be beneficial, while lower-achieving competition negatively affects disadvantaged students
more than their counterparts, although the effects are small.
3.4.6 School Level Effects Results
Results from school level regressions exploring the mechanisms through which charter schools affect tradi-
tional public schools are displayed in Table 3.15. Coefficient estimates are displayed for low and high attrition
schools interacted with higher-achieving charter competition. In order to ease interpretation, the bottom half
of the table converts the competitive effect estimates to approximate percent changes for each attrition level
relative achievement group relative to schools facing no attrition. Stars on percent changes indicate significant
differences between that group and schools facing no attrition.
The effects on student membership in column 1 for the attrition 0-1% lower-achieve and higher-achieve
groups are statistically significant and small suggesting a decrease of about 0.4% in membership. School facing
>1% attrition from lower-achieving charter competition experience declines in membership of about 1.8% and
schools facing >1% attrition from higher-achieving charter competition experience declines in membership of
about 2.8%. Across groups, there is no effect on number of teachers which suggests that class sizes should go
down, which is the case in column 3. The decrease in class size is largest in magnitude for schools facing >1%
attrition from higher-achieving charter competition which may partially explain the more positive effects from
higher-achieving competition on student test scores, but the difference in class size effects relative to lower-
achieving competition is very small.
Effects on school ethnicity proportions, gifted, disabled, limited English proficient, and economically dis-
advantaged proportions are displayed in the remaining columns. In general, effects on these outcomes are
small. Higher-achieving charter competition slightly decreases the proportion of white students and increases
the proportion of economically disadvantaged students while lower-achieving charter competition decreases the
proportion of Hispanic students and increases the proportion of gifted students. If higher proportions of gifted
and smaller proportions of economically disadvantaged students suggest a stronger peer group, this would lead
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us to suspect that lower-achieving charter competition should have more positive effects on student test scores
than higher-achieving competition. This is at odds with the results I find, which suggests that these allocative
effects may not explain the more positive effects on test scores from higher-achieving competition. This leaves
the possibility that teacher quality and responses to competition may be the relevant mechanisms.
3.4.7 Effects in Context
Studies in states other than North Carolina following a similar empirical strategy to that employed in this
paper find mixed results. Sass (2006) finds a positive effect on math test scores and no effect on reading in
Florida. Zimmer et al. (2009) analyze effects across eight geographic locations and generally find no significant
effects apart from a small positive effect in Texas. In North Carolina, previous results have also been mixed.
Bifulco and Ladd (2006) find no effect on student test scores, although effects are generally positive, while
Holmes et al. (2003) find a small positive effect using a school level analysis. Jinnai (2014) finds a small
positive effect and shows that defining competition at the grade level rather than the school level increases effect
sizes. Mehta (2017) finds a small positive spillover effect when estimating a model of charter and traditional
public school competition that models charter school entry, school inputs, and student school choices.
All the studies mentioned that are conducted in North Carolina are estimated using data between 1996 and
2005 and use distance based measures of competition. Using distance based measures of competition in period 1
(1997-2005), I confirm the general finding of small positive effects in math and reading. The attrition measures
I employ do not confirm this finding, but the specifications I use also include a control for traditional public
schools facing no attrition within 10 miles of a charter school, and the coefficient is statically insignificant and
close to zero. This suggests that schools facing attrition that are not within 10 miles of any charter are responsible
for the slightly divergent findings.
Comparing effect sizes to other studies is complicated by differences in competition measures and differ-
ences in the construction of outcome measures. Perhaps most directly comparable is Cremata and Raymond
(2014) which use standardized test score gains as the outcome and attrition measures of competition interacted
with charter achievement as the treatment. They define high-achieving competition as an indicator that is one
if the average achievement of charter competitors of a traditional public school is above the district average.
In Washington DC, where charter enrollment was over 40% of public school enrollment by 2012, they find
high-achieving competition improves math scores by 0.04-0.08 (when significant) and reading test scores by
0.06 to 0.15 relative to low-achieving competition. Cordes (2018) also allows effects to vary by charter school
achievement, and defines high-achieving competition in New York City as an indicator if the average proficiency
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of competing charters is above the 75th percentile of the city in the prior year. She finds no premium to high-
achieving competition in math, but in reading finds a premium of 0.017 standard deviations. I generally find
higher-achieving competition increases test score gains by 0.01-0.03 standard deviations which falls between
the effect sizes in these two studies.
Finally, it is useful to compare effect sizes to other policy interventions. Of particular, importance are the
estimated effects of charter schools on charter school students as these studies often rely on the assumption
of no spillover effects on traditional public schools. The CREDO National Charter School Study includes the
analysis of charter schools in 27 states and generally finds aggregate effect sizes between -0.03 and 0.03 standard
deviations (CREDO 2013b). Finally, Ladd et al. (2016) find effects between 0 and -0.03 standard deviations in
North Carolina using a student fixed effects approach.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of charter schools on traditional public school students in North Carolina
and finds that, on average, charter schools in North Carolina have no economically significant effect on math
or reading test scores. Also, I examine whether effects differ by the relative achievement of traditional public
and charter schools, and find higher-achieving competition has small positive effects, while lower-achieving
competition has zero to very small negative effects. Interactions with student characteristics suggest that more
disadvantaged students left behind in traditional public schools facing lower-achieving charter competition gen-
erally experience the same or more negative effects in reading than their counterparts. Additionally, the cases of
more positive effects on math test scores for disadvantaged students relative to their counterparts occur in schools
facing higher-achieving competition. This suggests that the shift in charter schools to serving higher-achieving
students has, at the very least, not hurt disadvantaged students left behind and may even be beneficial.
Charter schools may locate based on trends in traditional public school achievement, or based on relevant
shocks near the time of charter school application. Linear school trends and lagged school controls are strate-
gies to address these concerns, and results are insensitive to their inclusion. This suggests that controlling for
time-invariant student and school heterogeneity may be adequate to control for endogeneity concerns. Results
are somewhat sensitive to the persistence assumption, but effects are generally the same sign and significance
regardless of assuming perfect or zero persistence in student test scores.
The findings of this paper have implications for research on the competitive effects of charter schools on
traditional public school students. Although the effect sizes I find are small, the literature, when effects are
significant, generally finds small positive or negative effects. Differential effects based on the relative achieve-
ment levels of competitors may explain differences in competitive effects across previous competition studies,
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and even competition studies based on the same state if characteristics of the charter school sector change over
time within a state. This suggests that future work examining the effects of charter schools on traditional public
school students should consider heterogeneous treatment effects based on the relative characteristics of tradi-
tional public and charter schools.
The findings of this study also have implications for research on the competitive effects of charter schools
on charter school students. Studies of charter school productivity often employ local matching techniques or
use lottery information to compare students lotteried in and those lotteried out of an oversubscribed charter
school. The methods assume that charter schools have no spillover effects on traditional public schools which
has been shown here to depend on the relative achievement of competitors. This may be especially relevant for
lottery based studies where oversubscribed charter schools are possibly in high demand because of their high
achievement.
Future work will examine other mechanisms through which charter schools affect traditional public school
students. For example, changes in teacher composition may partially explain the observed effects on traditional
public school students. As higher-achieving charter schools have grown in North Carolina, it is also important
to understand which types of charter schools are approved by the State Board of Education, where these charter
schools locate, and whether they are accessible to students from all backgrounds. Future research will use
information collected from individual charter school applications to address these questions.
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Table 3.1: Competition Measure Definitions
Competition Measure Definition
Attrition Based Measures
Attrition 0% Indicates if a TPS has 0% of prior year enrollment non-
structurally switch to any charter in the current year (base)
Attrition 0-1% Indicates if a TPS has 0-1% of prior year enrollment non-
structurally switch to any charter in the current year
Attrition >1% Indicates if a TPS has >1% of prior year enrollment non-
structurally switch to any charter in the current year
Higher-Achieving Charter Indicates if the average lagged test scores of students in charter
schools from which a TPS faces attrition are higher than the av-
erage lagged test scores of the TPS students
Distance Based Measures
Within 10 Miles 0 Charter Indicates if a TPS is not within 10 miles of any charter and not
one of the closest 10 TPSs to any charter (base)
Within 10 Miles 1 Charter Indicates if a TPS is within 10 miles of one charter and one of the
closest 10 TPSs to that charter
Within 10 Miles 2 or More Charters Indicates if a TPS is within 10 miles of 2 or more charters and
one of the closest 10 TPSs to those charters
Higher-Achieving Charter Indicates if the average lagged test scores of students in charter
schools within 10 miles of the TPS are higher than the average
lagged test scores of the TPS students
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. All competition measures have the added restriction that
schools can compete only if they serve at least one grade level that is the same. I define non-structural switchers as students that
switch schools when they could have stayed an additional year at their prior school. Attrition based measures of competition have
the added restriction that non-structural moves are only counted toward attrition if the distance between schools is less than 20 miles.
All distance competition measures have the added restriction that a traditional public school be one of the closest 10 traditional
public schools to a charter school. Distances between schools are straight line distances.
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Table 3.2: Summary of Distances between Traditional Public and Charter Schools by Urbanicity
Urban Suburban Town Rural
Non-Structural Student Moves From TPSs to Charters:
Median Distance Between Schools 4.25 5.66 3.29 7.81
75th Percentile Distance Between Schools 6.80 9.25 7.65 12.21
Number of Switchers 14,719 6,904 4,828 13,333
Average Distance of Charter Schools to the:
5th Closest TPS 2.7 4.4 7.2 7.9
10th Closest TPS 4.4 6.8 13.3 11.7
15th Closest TPS 6.0 8.9 17.3 15.3
TPS refers to traditional public school. Pooled for years 1998-2016. Distances are in miles. Student moves are restricted to
grade levels between 3 and 12. Average distance between schools only considers schools that overlap in at least one grade level.
Non-structural switchers are defined as students that switch schools when they could have stayed an additional year at their prior
school.
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Table 3.3: Charter and Traditional Public School Characteristics by Attrition Status and Period
Panel A: Period 1 (1997-2005) Panel B: Period 2 (2006-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TPS No
Attrition
TPS
Attrition
Charter
TPS No
Attrition
TPS
Attrition
Charter
Math Std -0.00a 0.01a -0.19*a -0.01 -0.01 0.09
Read Std -0.01 0.01a -0.06a -0.01 -0.02 0.21*
Black 0.28*a 0.35a 0.36a 0.24* 0.31 0.28
Hispanic 0.05*a 0.06a 0.02*a 0.12* 0.14 0.06*
White 0.63*a 0.54a 0.58 0.56* 0.47 0.60*
Free Lunch 0.36a 0.35a 0.12*a 0.45* 0.46 0.26*
Lim Eng Prof 0.03*a 0.03a 0.00*a 0.06 0.06 0.02*
Disability 0.14a 0.14a 0.14 0.15* 0.14 0.13*
Gifted 0.12*a 0.15 0.06*a 0.14* 0.16 0.02*
Enrollment 507.61*a 627.43a 210.05*a 497.73* 612.30 432.72*
Urban 0.21*a 0.39a 0.41 0.20* 0.35 0.41
Rural 0.45*a 0.32a 0.28 0.50* 0.36 0.29
Suburban 0.18a 0.18 0.13 0.15* 0.18 0.14
Town 0.16* 0.11 0.19* 0.15* 0.11 0.15
Elementary 0.61a 0.60 0.20*a 0.63 0.61 0.12*
Middle 0.19* 0.28 0.09*a 0.20* 0.29 0.04*
Elem-Middle 0.13*a 0.10a 0.48* 0.10* 0.07 0.53*
Middle-High 0.05* 0.02 0.11* 0.05* 0.02 0.06*
Elem-Mid-High 0.02* 0.01 0.13*a 0.02* 0.01 0.26*
Observations 10188 3488 565 13766 6941 1125
TPS refers to traditional public school. TPS Attrition includes TPSs that are facing any amount of attrition to charter schools that
are no more than 20 miles away from the TPSs. All groups are restricted to schools serving a grade level between 3 and 8. Statistics
are weighted by school membership in grades 3 through 8 for the top panel and unweighted for the bottom panel. Standard errors
are clustered at the school level. Significant differences relative to TPS Attrition within each period are starred, ∗, for p < 0.05.
Significant differences between periods for each group are lettered, a, for p < 0.05 in Panel A.
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Table 3.4: Count and Proportion of Traditional Public Schools Experiencing Attrition to Higher or Lower-
Achieving Charter Schools for Period 1 and Period 2 in Math and Reading Conditional on Schools Experiencing
Any Attrition
Lower-Achieving
Charter Competition
Higher-Achieving
Charter Competition
Total
Math
Period 1 2,316 (68%) 1,103 (32%) 3,419 (100%)
Period 2 Full 3,067 (45%) 3,734 (55%) 6,801 (100%)
Period 2 Split 937 (39%) 1,454 (61%) 2,391 (100%)
Reading
Period 1 2,047 (60%) 1,372 (40%) 3,419 (100%)
Period 2 Full 2,320 (34%) 4,481 (66%) 6,801 (100%)
Period 2 Split 712 (30%) 1,679 (70%) 2,391 (100%)
Sample is restricted to traditional public schools (TPSs) facing attrition. Higher-achieving charter competition
includes TPSs facing attrition and the lagged test scores of the TPS students are lower on average than that of
the lagged test scores of students in charter schools from which the TPS is facing attrition. Full includes TPSs
facing attrition from charter schools operating in period 2 that opened in period 1 or period 2. Split isolates TPSs
facing attrition from charter schools operating in period 2 that opened in period 2 and does not count charter
schools that opened in period 1 in defining competition. Period 1 ranges from 1997-2005, and period 2 from
2006-2016.
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Table 3.5: Control Variable Definitions
Name Definition
Student Level
Cohort Switcher* Indicates Student Moves with >15% of Cohort to a New School
Non-Cohort Switcher* Indicates a Non-Cohort Switcher Move
Grade Repeater* Indicates a Student Repeats a Grade
School Level
Within 5 Miles Closed* Indicates a School is Within 5 Miles of a Closing TPS
Within 5 Miles Open* Indicates a School is Within 5 Miles of an Opening TPS
Grade Decrease* Indicates a School Decreases Grade Span
Grade Increase* Indicates a School Increases Grade Span
Enrollment Number of Students Attending a School
Disabled Proportion of Disabled Students in a School
Limited English Proficient Proportion of Limited English Proficient Students in a School
Gifted Proportion of Gifted Students in a School
White Proportion of White Students in a School
Black Proportion of Black Students in a School
Hispanic Proportion of Hispanic Students in a School
*Indicates covariates that are included contemporaneously with the dependent variable. All other covariates are lagged one period
in regressions.
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Table 3.6: First Differenced Regressions of Standardized Student Test Score Gains on Attrition Competition
Measures Interacted with Relative Achievement and Period for Years 1997-2016 without School Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Math Math Math Read Read Read
Attrition 0-1% 0.003 -0.007*** -0.007 0.004** -0.002 -0.008**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Attrition >1% 0.005 -0.016** -0.004 0.009** -0.001 -0.005
(0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.011*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.043*** 0.030* 0.017** 0.021**
(0.009) (0.016) (0.007) (0.010)
Attrition 0-1% * Period2 -0.000 0.011**
(0.006) (0.005)
Attrition >1% * Period2 -0.022* 0.005
(0.013) (0.011)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH * Period2 -0.007 -0.009
(0.008) (0.006)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH * Period2 0.021 -0.006
(0.018) (0.013)
Observations 4,016,929 4,016,929 4,016,929 3,994,994 3,994,994 3,994,994
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. Dependent variables are standardized traditional public
school student test score gains in math or reading. All regressions include grade-year dummy variables, controls for student switch-
ing, grade repetition, and school level covariates. Attrition 0-1% indicates if a TPS has strictly greater than 0% but less than or
equal to 1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any CH in the current year. Attrition >1% indicates if a TPS has
>1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any charter in the current year. Attrition equal to zero is the omitted cate-
gory. Non-structural switchers are students that switch schools when they could have stayed an additional year at their prior school.
Higher-Achieve CH indicators are one if the average lagged test scores of students in a TPS are lower than the average lagged test
scores of students in charter schools from which the TPS is facing attrition. Period2 is an indicator for years between 2006 and
2016. Dependent and independent variables are first differenced with respect to student-school spells to remove student and school
heterogeneity, and the resulting equation is estimated using OLS. I assume persistence is one. Period 1 ranges from 1997-2005, and
period 2 from 2006-2016. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Table 3.7: First Differenced Regressions of Standardized Student Test Score Gains on Attrition Competition
Measures Interacted with Relative Achievement for Years 1997-2016 without School Trends: Various Persis-
tence Strategies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Math Math Math Read Read Read
Attrition 0-1% -0.007*** -0.002 -0.007*** -0.002 0.000 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Attrition >1% -0.016** -0.003 -0.016*** -0.001 0.002 0.010**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.027*** 0.008*** 0.021*** 0.011*** 0.004* 0.011***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.043*** 0.011** 0.039*** 0.017** 0.005 0.000
(0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Persistence 0.662 0.875
(0.036) (0.042)
High Persistence Yes Yes
Low Persistence Yes Yes
Arellano-Bond Yes Yes
Observations 4,016,929 4,016,929 2,331,311 3,994,994 3,994,994 2,318,503
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. Dependent variables are standardized traditional public
school student test score gains in math or reading. All regressions include grade-year dummy variables, controls for student switch-
ing, grade repetition, and school level covariates. Attrition 0-1% indicates if a TPS has strictly greater than 0% but less than or
equal to 1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any CH in the current year. Attrition >1% indicates if a TPS has
>1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any charter in the current year. Attrition equal to zero is the omitted cate-
gory. Non-structural switchers are students that switch schools when they could have stayed an additional year at their prior school.
Higher-Achieve CH indicators are one if the average lagged test scores of students in a TPS are lower than the average lagged test
scores of students in charter schools from which the TPS is facing attrition. Dependent and independent variables are first differ-
enced with respect to student-school spells to remove student and school heterogeneity, and the resulting equation is estimated using
OLS. High persistence assumes that persistence in test scores is 1, and low assumes 0 persistence. Standard errors are clustered at
the school level except for Arellano-Bond estimation which are clustered at the student level. I conduct Arellano-Bond estimation
by first differencing a lagged value added model and instrumenting for lagged test score differences using thrice lagged student math
and reading test scores and thrice lagged school characteristics. The first difference is taken with respect to student-school spell fixed
effects.
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Table 3.8: First Differenced Regressions of Standardized Student Test Score Gains on Attrition Competition
Measures Interacted with Relative Achievement for Years 1997-2016: Math Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Math Math Math Math Math
Attrition 0-1% -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006* -0.008** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Attrition >1% -0.016** -0.018*** -0.017** -0.017** -0.016**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.043***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Attrition 0% Within 10 CH -0.002
(0.004)
Within 5 Closed Private -0.009***
(0.003)
Within 5 New Private 0.000
(0.003)
Trends Yes
Time-Varying Unobservables Yes
Distance Control Yes
Private School Controls Yes
Observations 4,016,929 4,016,929 3,545,591 4,016,834 4,016,834
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. Dependent variables are standardized traditional public
school student test score gains in math or reading. All regressions include grade-year dummy variables, controls for student
switching, grade repetition, and school level covariates. Attrition 0-1% indicates if a TPS has strictly greater than 0% but less
than or equal to 1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any CH in the current year. Attrition >1% indicates
if a TPS has >1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any charter in the current year. Attrition equal to zero
is the omitted category. Non-structural switchers are students that switch schools when they could have stayed an additional
year at their prior school. Higher-Achieve CH indicators are one if the average lagged test scores of students in a TPS are
lower than the average lagged test scores of students in charter schools from which the TPS is facing attrition. Dependent and
independent variables are first differenced with respect to student-school spells to remove student and school heterogeneity, and
the resulting equation is estimated using OLS. Models with school trends are estimated using school fixed effect estimation.
I assume persistence is one. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. Trends includes a linear trend for each school.
Time-Varying Unobservables includes thrice lagged average school achievement, controls, and competition measures. Distance
Control includes a dummy variable that is one if a school is within 10 miles of any charter, but not experiencing attrition. Private
School Controls includes indicators that are one if a TPS is within 5 miles of a new or closing private school.
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Table 3.9: First Differenced Regressions of Standardized Student Test Score Gains on Attrition Competition
Measures Interacted with Relative Achievement for Years 1997-2016: Reading Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Read Read Read Read Read
Attrition 0-1% -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Attrition >1% -0.001 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.017** 0.016** 0.012 0.017** 0.017**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Attrition 0% Within 10 CH -0.002
(0.003)
Within 5 Closed Private -0.005*
(0.002)
Within 5 New Private 0.006***
(0.003)
Trends Yes
Time-Varying Unobservables Yes
Distance Control Yes
Private School Controls Yes
Observations 3,994,994 3,994,994 3,166,660 3,994,899 3,994,899
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. Dependent variables are standardized traditional public
school student test score gains in math or reading. All regressions include grade-year dummy variables, controls for student
switching, grade repetition, and school level covariates. Attrition 0-1% indicates if a TPS has strictly greater than 0% but less
than or equal to 1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any CH in the current year. Attrition >1% indicates
if a TPS has >1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any charter in the current year. Attrition equal to zero
is the omitted category. Non-structural switchers are students that switch schools when they could have stayed an additional
year at their prior school. Higher-Achieve CH indicators are one if the average lagged test scores of students in a TPS are
lower than the average lagged test scores of students in charter schools from which the TPS is facing attrition. Dependent and
independent variables are first differenced with respect to student-school spells to remove student and school heterogeneity, and
the resulting equation is estimated using OLS. Models with school trends are estimated using school fixed effect estimation.
I assume persistence is one. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. Trends includes a linear trend for each school.
Time-Varying Unobservables includes thrice lagged average school achievement, controls, and competition measures. Distance
Control includes a dummy variable that is one if a school is within 10 miles of any charter, but not experiencing attrition. Private
School Controls includes indicators that are one if a TPS is within 5 miles of a new or closing private school.
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Table 3.10: Fixed Effect Regressions of Standardized Student Test Score Gains on Attrition Competition Mea-
sures Interacted with Relative Achievement for Years 1997-2016 without School Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Math Math Read Read
Attrition 0-1% 0.002 -0.009*** 0.004** -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Attrition >1% 0.004 -0.018*** 0.010*** -0.000
(0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.029*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.003)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.043*** 0.017***
(0.009) (0.006)
Observations 8,735,199 8,734,975 8,694,404 8,694,180
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. Dependent variables are standardized traditional
public school student test score gains in math or reading. All regressions include grade-year dummy variables, controls
for student switching, grade repetition, and school level covariates. Attrition 0-1% indicates if a TPS has strictly greater
than 0% but less than or equal to 1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any CH in the current year.
Attrition >1% indicates if a TPS has >1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any charter in the current
year. Attrition equal to zero is the omitted category. Non-structural switchers are students that switch schools when they
could have stayed an additional year at their prior school. Higher-Achieve CH indicators are one if the average lagged
test scores of students in a TPS are lower than the average lagged test scores of students in charter schools from which
the TPS is facing attrition. Dependent and independent variables are in levels. Spell fixed effects are included to control
for student and school heterogeneity, and models are estimated using fixed effect estimation. I assume persistence is
one. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Table 3.11: First Differenced Regressions of Standardized Student Test Score Gains on Distance Competition
Measures Interacted with Relative Achievement for Years 1997-2016 without School Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Math Math Read Read
Within 10 1 CH 0.002 -0.018** 0.005 -0.010*
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Within 10 2 or More CH 0.019* -0.006 0.015** -0.001
(0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Within 10 1 CH * Higher-Achieve CH 0.044*** 0.027***
(0.006) (0.004)
Within 10 2 or More CH * Higher-Achieve CH 0.057*** 0.031***
(0.011) (0.007)
Observations 4,015,639 3,969,834 3,993,715 3,948,171
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. Dependent variables are standardized traditional
public school student test score gains in math or reading. All regressions include grade-year dummy variables, controls
for student switching, grade repetition, and school level covariates. Within 10 1 CH indicates if a TPS is within 10
miles of one charter school and one of the closest 10 TPSs to that charter. Within 10 2 or More CH indicates if a TPS
is within 10 miles of more than one charter school and one of the closest 10 TPSs to those charter schools. Within
10 miles of no charter school is the omitted category. Higher-Achieve CH indicators are one if the average lagged test
scores of students in a TPS are lower than the average lagged test scores of students in charter schools within 10 miles.
Dependent and independent variables are first differenced with respect to student-school spells to remove student and
school heterogeneity, and the resulting equation is estimated using OLS. I assume persistence is one. Standard errors are
clustered at the school level.
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Table 3.12: First Differenced Instrumental Variable Regressions of Standardized Student Test Score Gains on
Attrition Competition Measures Interacted with Relative Achievement for Years 1997-2016 without School
Trends
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Math Read
Attrition 0-1% -0.012* -0.003
(0.006) (0.005)
Attrition >1% -0.055*** -0.017
(0.020) (0.017)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.041*** 0.016*
(0.016) (0.008)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.11*** 0.045*
(0.032) (0.021)
First Stage F (0-1%) 171 169
First Stage F (>1%) 77 72
Hansen J P-Value 0.10 0.53
Observations 3,545,591 3,525,152
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. Dependent variables are
standardized traditional public school student test score gains in math or reading. All regressions
include grade-year dummy variables, controls for student switching, grade repetition, and school
level covariates. Attrition 0-1% indicates if a TPS has strictly greater than 0% but less than or equal
to 1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any CH in the current year. Attrition>1%
indicates if a TPS has >1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any charter in the
current year. Attrition equal to zero is the omitted category. Non-structural switchers are students
that switch schools when they could have stayed an additional year at their prior school. Higher-
Achieve CH indicators are one if the average lagged test scores of students in a TPS are lower
than the average lagged test scores of students in charter schools from which the TPS is facing
attrition. Dependent and independent variables are first differenced with respect to student-school
spells to remove student and school heterogeneity, and the resulting equation is estimated using
instrumental variables. I assume persistence is one. Standard errors are clustered at the school
level. Terms interacted with Higher-Achieve CH are endogenous. There are four instrumental
variables including relative achievement constructed from thrice lagged math scores interacted
with 0-1% and >1% attrition, and relative achievement measures constructed from thrice lagged
reading scores interacted with 0-1% and >1% attrition. The inclusion of instruments based on
both math and reading overidentifies the model and allows for a test of overidentifying restrictions
which is reported as Hansen J p-value. The null is that the instruments are valid. F-tests of the four
excluded instruments are also reported for the two first stages (one for each endogenous regressor).
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Table 3.13: First Differenced Regressions of Standardized Student Test Score Gains on Attrition Competition Measures Interacted with Relative Achieve-
ment and Demographic Measures for Years 1997-2016 without School Trends: Heterogeneity by School Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Math Math Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read Read Read
Attrition 0-1% -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Attrition >1% -0.002 0.005 0.004 0.012 0.005 0.004 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.009* 0.008* 0.008**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH 2Lag 0.013*** 0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH 2Lag 0.017* 0.001
(0.009) (0.007)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH District 0.012*** 0.007**
(0.004) (0.003)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH District 0.002 -0.003
(0.009) (0.007)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH-CH 0.008** 0.003
(0.004) (0.003)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH-CH 0.003 -0.004
(0.009) (0.007)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-White CH 0.006 -0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
Attrition >1% * Higher-White CH -0.009 -0.001
(0.009) (0.007)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Disabled CH 0.003 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Disabled CH 0.001 0.002
(0.009) (0.006)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-LEP CH 0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.004)
Attrition >1% * Higher-LEP CH 0.013 0.006
(0.014) (0.010)
Observations 3,876,324 4,016,929 4,016,929 4,016,929 4,016,929 4,016,929 3,854,874 3,994,994 3,994,994 3,994,994 3,994,994 3,994,994
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. Dependent variables are standardized TPS student test score gains in math or reading. All regressions
include grade-year dummy variables, controls for student switching, grade repetition, and school level covariates. Attrition 0-1% indicates if a TPS has 0-1% of prior year enrollment
non-structurally switch to any CH in the current year. Non-structural switchers are students that switch schools when they could have stayed an additional year at their prior school.
Higher-Achieve CH 2Lag indicates if the second lag of average lagged scores of students in a TPS are lower than the average lagged scores of students in competing CHs. Higher-
Achieve CH District indicates if the lagged scores of students in competing CHs are greater than the average lagged scores of the district in which the TPS is located. Higher-Achieve
CH-CH indicates if the CHs competing with a TPS have higher average lagged scores than that of the average of all CHs. Higher-White CH indicates if the TPS has a lower proportion
of white students compared to competing CHs. Higher-Disabled CH and Higher-LEP CH (Limited English Proficient) are defined similarly. Dependent and independent variables
are first differenced with respect to student-school spells to remove student and school heterogeneity, and the resulting equation is estimated using OLS. I assume persistence is one.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Table 3.14: First Differenced Regressions of Standardized Student Test Score Gains on Attrition Relative Achievement Competition Measures Interacted
with Student Demographics for Years 1997-2016 without School Trends: Heterogeneity by Student Type
Black Hispanic Lim Eng Proficient Disabled Gifted Econ Disadv
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Math Read Math Read Math Read Math Read Math Read Math Read
Attrition 0-1% Lower-Achieve CH -0.006** -0.002 -0.007** -0.002 -0.007*** -0.002 -0.008*** -0.001 -0.009*** -0.004 -0.007* 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Attrition 0-1% Higher-Achieve CH 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.009*** 0.021*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Attrition >1% Lower-Achieve CH -0.021*** 0.001 -0.022*** -0.000 -0.016** -0.000 -0.016** -0.002 -0.017** -0.003 -0.034*** 0.017*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010)
Attrition >1% Higher-Achieve CH 0.021*** 0.011** 0.021*** 0.013** 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.014*** 0.027*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.017***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Attrition 0-1 Lower-Achieve CH * Demo -0.006 -0.002 -0.008 0.004 -0.012 -0.005 0.003 -0.011** 0.005 0.007* -0.002 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Attrition 0-1% Higher-Achieve CH * Demo 0.007 0.003 0.017** -0.006 0.003 -0.010 0.000 0.002 -0.007 -0.001 0.010** -0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Attrition >1% Lower-Achieve CH * Demo 0.000 -0.003 0.006 -0.028* -0.007 -0.046* -0.007 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.014 -0.033***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.024) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Attrition >1% Higher-Achieve CH * Demo 0.009 0.010 0.002 -0.011 -0.016 -0.019 0.004 0.008 -0.012 -0.010 -0.001 -0.006
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 3,405,467 3,389,246 2,722,869 2,708,509 4,013,095 3,990,724 4,013,095 3,990,724 4,013,095 3,990,724 2,486,153 2,471,538
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. Dependent variables are standardized traditional public school student test score gains in math or reading. All
regressions include grade-year dummy variables, controls for student switching, grade repetition, and school level covariates. Attrition 0-1% indicates if a TPS has strictly greater than
0% but less than or equal to 1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any CH in the current year. Attrition >1% indicates if a TPS has >1% of prior year enrollment
non-structurally switch to any charter in the current year. Attrition equal to zero is the omitted category. Non-structural switchers are students that switch schools when they could
have stayed an additional year at their prior school. Higher-Achieve CH indicators are one if the average lagged test scores of students in a TPS are lower than the average lagged test
scores of students in charter schools from which the TPS is facing attrition. Instead of interacting Higher-Achieve CH with attrition dummies, I create separate group indicators for each
combination of attrition (0-1% or >1%) and achievement (higher or lower). I interact these group indicators with indicators for whether a student is black, Hispanic, limited English
proficient, disabled, gifted, or economically disadvantaged. The interaction terms change based on the specific demographic characteristic based on the column heading. Economically
disadvantaged information at the student level is only available in period 2. Dependent and independent variables are first differenced with respect to student-school spells to remove
student and school heterogeneity, and the resulting equation is estimated using OLS. I assume persistence is one. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Table 3.15: School Fixed Effect Regressions of Various School Outcomes on Attrition Competition Measures Interacted with Relative Achievement for
Years 1997-2016 without School Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES Member
Teacher
Count
Pupil/
Teacher
Ratio
White % Black %
Hispanic
%
Gifted %
Disabled
%
LEP %
Econ
Disadvanted
%
Coefficient Estimates
Attrition 0-1% -2.53* -0.02 -0.08* 0.11 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.17
(1.35) (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.24)
Attrition >1% -10.01*** -0.17 -0.18** 0.17 -0.03 -0.20** 0.46** 0.18 -0.12 0.11
(2.29) (0.15) (0.09) (0.20) (0.20) (0.10) (0.18) (0.15) (0.09) (0.51)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH -0.62 -0.00 -0.05 -0.32*** 0.14 0.12* 0.05 0.08 0.12* -0.11
(1.89) (0.13) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.12) (0.08) (0.06) (0.34)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH -4.02 -0.08 -0.13 -0.51** 0.37 0.33** -0.66*** -0.03 0.13 0.72
(2.89) (0.20) (0.10) (0.23) (0.24) (0.13) (0.23) (0.18) (0.13) (0.62)
Approximate Percentage Change
Attrition 0-1% & Lower-Achieve CH -0.3%* -0.0% -0.5%* 0.2% -0.1% -0.4% 0.0% 0.0% -1.3% 0.5%
Attrition >1% & Lower-Achieve CH -1.8%*** -0.4% -1.3%** 0.4% -0.1% -2.0%** 3.2%** 1.2% -2.3% 0.2%
Attrition 0-1% & Higher-Achieve CH -0.4%** -0.0% -0.08%*** -0.5%*** 0.3% 0.6% 0.5% 0.8%* 0.9% 0.1%
Attrition >1% & Higher-Achieve CH -2.8%*** -0.7% -2.2%*** -1.0%** 0.7%** 1.0% -2.0% 0.9% 0.0% 1.4%*
Observations 31,953 27,554 27,534 31,981 31,981 31,981 31,971 31,971 31,971 28,205
Number of Schools 1996 1989 1989 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1989
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. Following the student level models, all school level model dependent variables are in gains. I use fixed effect
estimation and cluster standard errors at the school level. Attrition 0-1% indicates if a TPS has strictly greater than 0% but less than or equal to 1% of prior year enrollment non-
structurally switch to any CH in the current year. Attrition >1% indicates if a TPS has >1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any charter in the current year. Attrition
equal to zero is the omitted category. Non-structural switchers are students that switch schools when they could have stayed an additional year at their prior school. Higher-Achieve CH
indicators are one if the average lagged test scores of students in a TPS are lower than the average lagged test scores of students in charter schools from which the TPS is facing attrition.
Competition measures are interacted with a dummy variable indicating if a school is in its third or later year of strictly positive attrition because allocative effects may be largest in
the initial years of competition. These interaction terms are omitted. Therefore, the coefficient estimates can be interpreted as the effect of attrition in the first two years of exposure
to attrition relative to schools not facing attrition. Approximate percentage changes are calculated as the coefficient estimate for the attrition group divided by the average level of the
dependent variable for the attrition group between 1997 and 2016.
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Figure 3.1: Relative Achievement Regression Coefficients by Persistence Parameter Values for Math, 1997-2016
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. This table reports the marginal effects of charter com-
petition on traditional public school students for the groups: attrition 0-1% lower-achieving charter competition, attrition 0-1%
higher-achieving charter competition, attrition >1% lower-achieving charter competition, and attrition >1% higher-achieving char-
ter competition. Different estimates are reported for different persistent parameters ranging from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.10. The
dependent variable is standardized math test score gains (qt − λqt−1) where the gain varies based on the persistence parameter λ.
All regressions include grade-year dummy variables, controls for student switching, grade repetition, and school level covariates.
Attrition 0-1% indicates if a TPS has strictly greater than 0% but less than or equal to 1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally
switch to any CH in the current year. Attrition >1% indicates if a TPS has >1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to
any charter in the current year. Non-structural switchers are students that switch schools when they could have stayed an additional
year at their prior school. Higher-Achieve CH indicators are one if the average lagged test scores of students in a TPS are lower
than the average lagged test scores of students in charter schools from which the TPS is facing attrition. Dependent and independent
variables are first differenced with respect to student-school spells to remove student and school heterogeneity, and the resulting
equation is estimated using OLS.
87
Figure 3.2: Relative Achievement Regression Coefficients by Persistence Parameter Values for Reading, 1997-
2016
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. This table reports the marginal effects of charter com-
petition on traditional public school students for the groups: attrition 0-1% lower-achieving charter competition, attrition 0-1%
higher-achieving charter competition, attrition >1% lower-achieving charter competition, and attrition >1% higher-achieving char-
ter competition. Different estimates are reported for different persistent parameters ranging from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.10. The
dependent variable is standardized math test score gains (qt − λqt−1) where the gain varies based on the persistence parameter λ.
All regressions include grade-year dummy variables, controls for student switching, grade repetition, and school level covariates.
Attrition 0-1% indicates if a TPS has strictly greater than 0% but less than or equal to 1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally
switch to any CH in the current year. Attrition >1% indicates if a TPS has >1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to
any charter in the current year. Non-structural switchers are students that switch schools when they could have stayed an additional
year at their prior school. Higher-Achieve CH indicators are one if the average lagged test scores of students in a TPS are lower
than the average lagged test scores of students in charter schools from which the TPS is facing attrition. Dependent and independent
variables are first differenced with respect to student-school spells to remove student and school heterogeneity, and the resulting
equation is estimated using OLS.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR THE EFFECTS OF CHARTER SCHOOLS ON TRADITIONAL PUBLIC SCHOOL
STUDENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA
A.1 Geocoding
School level data files from NCDPI contain latitudes and longitudes for charter and traditional public schools
in North Carolina. School latitudes are available starting in 2001 and addresses in 1999. Charter schools start
entering in 1998 so I impute addresses from 1999 to 1998. This means that any schools open in 1998 that close in
1999 will not have location information. School universe files are not available for 2016 at the time of this study,
so I obtain 2016 address information from the Educational Directory and Demographical Information Exchange
(EDDIE) which is maintained by the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. I then geocode all school
addresses that do not have a corresponding latitude and longitude using http://www.gpsvisualizer.com/geocoder/.
This website accesses Bing Maps for the actual conversion of addresses to latitude and longitude.
I link each traditional public school to every charter school and calculate distances between each pair to
create distance based measures of competition. The STATA command I use is geodist which computes geodetic
distances between two pairs of latitudes and longitudes. The geodetic distance is the length of the shortest curve
between two points along the surface of a mathematical model of the Earth. There is concern that some school
addresses in 1999 and 2000 may be mailing and not physical addresses. If an address contains any post office
box information, I assume it is a mailing address and impute 2001 location information to 1999 and 2000. In
general, school mailing addresses and physical location are likely to coincide and even if mailing addresses are
used, they are likely close in proximity to the actual school.
Because some school-year location information is geocoded by the author and some is already available in
the school universe files, there is slight variation in latitudes and longitudes across time for some schools without
an address change. Even within the school universe files there is slight variation in latitudes and longitudes, and
there are instances when a latitude and longitude for a school will drastically change for one year without an
address change. To partially account for this, if a school address does not change over time, I impute the most
recent latitude and longitude. I use the most recent assuming that accuracy in geocoding methods has improved
over time. Finally, I impute surrounding school-year location information for any large jumps in latitude and
longitude within a school. After these revisions, 6.2% of public schools moved more than 0.5 miles sometime
between 1998 and 2016; among charter schools the proportion is 15.8%.
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A.2 Split Competition Measures
For each measure of competition (such as the number of charters within 10 miles of a traditional public
school) two sets of variables are defined based on whether or not period 1 charter schools are taken into account
in period 2. The main set of results are reported using full measures of competition that include charter schools
that opened in period 1 when defining competition in period 2. Specifications are also run using split measures
where competition is defined separately in each period so effects in period 1 can be interpreted as the effects
of charter schools that entered sometime in period 1, and effects in period 2 can be interpreted as the effects of
charter schools that entered sometime in period 2 ignoring charter schools that entered in period 1.
The main set of results presented in Table 3.6 use full competition while Table A.1 presents results using
split competition measures. This may provide a more direct comparison because then the effects of opening,
closing, and expanding charter schools within each period are being compared. By construction any estimates
for period 1 are left unchanged when compared to Table 3.6, but any coefficients on variables interacted with
period 2 will likely change. Overall, results do not change very much compared to Table 3.6 in terms of sign
and significance.
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Table A.1: First Differenced Regressions of Standardized Student Test Score Gains on Attrition Competition
Measures Interacted with Relative Achievement for Years 1997-2016 without School Trends: Split Competition
Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Math Math Read Read
Attrition 0-1% 0.005* -0.006 0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Attrition >1% 0.003 -0.013 0.010** -0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.028*** 0.011**
(0.006) (0.004)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.031*** 0.024***
(0.011) (0.008)
Observations 4,016,929 4,016,929 3,994,994 3,994,994
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. Dependent variables are standardized traditional
public school student test score gains in math or reading. All regressions include grade-year dummy variables, controls for
student switching, grade repetition, and school level covariates. Attrition 0-1% indicates if a TPS has strictly greater than
0% but less than or equal to 1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any CH in the current year. Attrition
>1% indicates if a TPS has >1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any charter in the current year. Attrition
equal to zero is the omitted category. Non-structural switchers are students that switch schools when they could have stayed
an additional year at their prior school. Higher-Achieve CH indicators are one if the average lagged test scores of students
in a TPS are lower than the average lagged test scores of students in charter schools from which the TPS is facing attrition.
Dependent and independent variables are first differenced with respect to student-school spells to remove student and school
heterogeneity, and the resulting equation is estimated using OLS. I assume persistence is one. Standard errors are clustered
at the school level.
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A.3 Relative Achievement Defined by School Achievement Lags
The primary definition of relative charter and traditional public school achievement used in this paper relies
of the lagged test scores of students attending a school at time t. Using lagged test scores allows charter schools
that are new to have a measure of achievement in their first year. The average lagged achievement of a new
charter school does not exist, so if I were to use lagged school achievement, identifying variation from the
opening of new charter schools would be lost. The test scores of students at the end of period t can not be used
to construct relative achievement measures because these test scores are outcomes of the competitive process.
The concern with using lagged student test scores is that, in their first year of operation, new charter school
achievement will be defined solely based on student test scores while in a different school. Additionally, students
and families may not be accurate in assessing the expected quality of a new charter school which may result in
noisy measures of relative achievement for the first year charters open. On the other hand, using lagged school
level achievement would remove a significant amount of variation in competition measures due to the opening
of new charter schools. This may be especially important for distance based measures of competition.
Table A.2 presents results using school lags of achievement rather than the lagged test scores of students
in a school at time t to construct relative achievement. Differences between these two measures may suggest
that student’s expectations of charter school quality before a charter opens is noisy or that the variation from the
opening of new charter schools is important to the estimates. Results for both attrition and distance measures of
competition reflect those found using student lags which suggest these are not a concern.
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Table A.2: First Differenced Regressions of Standardized Student Test Score Gains on Attrition and Distance
Competition Measures Interacted with Relative Achievement (Defined by Lagged School Achievement) for
Years 1997-2016 without School Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Math Read Math Read
Attrition 0-1% -0.005* 0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Attrition >1% -0.011 0.011
(0.007) (0.007)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.024*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.003)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.034*** 0.004
(0.010) (0.008)
Within 10 1 CH -0.013 -0.001
(0.010) (0.008)
Within 10 2 or More CH -0.002 0.011
(0.014) (0.010)
Within 10 1 CH * Higher-Achieve CH 0.032*** 0.019***
(0.008) (0.005)
Within 10 2 or More CH * Higher-Achieve CH 0.048*** 0.021***
(0.010) (0.007)
Observations 3,785,903 3,765,061 3,794,057 3,773,207
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. Dependent variables are standardized traditional
public school student test score gains in math or reading. All regressions include grade-year dummy variables, controls for
student switching, grade repetition, and school level covariates. Attrition 0-1% indicates if a TPS has strictly greater than
0% but less than or equal to 1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any CH in the current year. Attrition
>1% indicates if a TPS has>1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any charter in the current year. Attrition
equal to zero is the omitted category. Non-structural switchers are students that switch schools when they could have stayed
an additional year at their prior school. Higher-Achieve CH indicators are one if average lagged TPS achievement is lower
than the average lagged achievement of charter schools from which the TPS is facing attrition. Within 10 1 CH indicates if a
TPS is within 10 miles of one charter school and one of the closest 10 TPSs to that charter. Within 10 2 or More CH indicates
if a TPS is within 10 miles of more than one charter school and one of the closest 10 TPSs to those charter schools. Within
10 miles of no charter is the omitted category. Higher-Achieve CH indicators are one if average lagged TPS achievement
is lower than the average lagged achievement of charter schools within 10 miles. Dependent and independent variables are
first differenced with respect to student-school spells to remove student and school heterogeneity, and the resulting equation
is estimated using OLS. I assume persistence is one. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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A.4 Varying Attrition Cut-Off Levels
Table A.3 demonstrates that the choice of attrition cut-offs to define low and high attrition groups does not
substantially affect results.
Table A.3: First Differenced Regressions of Standardized Student Test Score Gains on Attrition Competition
Measures Interacted with Relative Achievement for Years 1997-2016 without School Trends: Various Attrition
Cut-Offs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Math Math Math Read Read Read
Attrition 0-1% -0.007*** -0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Attrition >1% -0.016** -0.001
(0.007) (0.006)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.027*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.003)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.043*** 0.017**
(0.009) (0.007)
Attrition 0-0.75% -0.007*** -0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Attrition >0.75% -0.012** 0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Attrition 0-0.75% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.027*** 0.012*
(0.004) (0.003)
Attrition >0.75% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.038*** 0.012**
(0.007) (0.006)
Attrition 0-0.5% -0.008*** -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Attrition >0.5% -0.009* 0.003
(0.005) (0.004)
Attrition 0-0.5% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.026*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.004)
Attrition >0.5% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.035*** 0.013***
(0.006) (0.004)
Observations 4,016,834 4,016,834 4,016,834 3,994,899 3,994,899 3,994,899
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. Dependent variables are standardized traditional public
school student test score gains in math or reading. All regressions include grade-year dummy variables, controls for student switch-
ing, grade repetition, and school level covariates. Attrition 0-1% indicates if a TPS has strictly greater than 0% but less than or
equal to 1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any CH in the current year. Attrition >1% indicates if a TPS has
>1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally switch to any charter in the current year. Attrition equal to zero is the omitted cate-
gory. Non-structural switchers are students that switch schools when they could have stayed an additional year at their prior school.
Higher-Achieve CH indicators are one if the average lagged test scores of students in a TPS are lower than the average lagged test
scores of students in charter schools from which the TPS is facing attrition. Period2 is an indicator for years between 2006 and
2016. Dependent and independent variables are first differenced with respect to student-school spells to remove student and school
heterogeneity, and the resulting equation is estimated using OLS. I assume persistence is one. Standard errors are clustered at the
school level.
94
A.5 Remove Attrition Outliers
Figure A.1 displays the density of school attrition percents conditional on schools that are facing any attri-
tion. In the regression results, I have removed all students in schools with greater than 5% attrition from the
analysis sample. Less than 1% of schools facing attrition have attrition greater than 5%.
Figure A.1: School Level Histogram of Percent Attrition Conditional on Any Attrition
Mean:0.86; Std:1.23 Count:11,879; Min:0.036; Max:24.7
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Table A.4: First Differenced Regressions of Standardized Student Test Score Gains on Attrition Competition
Measures Interacted with Relative Achievement for Years 1997-2016 without School Trends: No Outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Math Math Read Read
Attrition 0-1% 0.003 -0.007*** 0.004* -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Attrition >1% 0.005 -0.017** 0.008** -0.001
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Attrition 0-1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.027*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.003)
Attrition >1% * Higher-Achieve CH 0.042*** 0.016**
(0.010) (0.007)
Observations 4,005,520 4,005,425 3,983,667 3,983,572
TPS refers to traditional public school, and CH refers to charter school. Dependent variables are standardized
traditional public school student test score gains in math or reading. All regressions include grade-year dummy
variables, controls for student switching, grade repetition, and school level covariates. Attrition 0-1% indicates
if a TPS has strictly greater than 0% but less than or equal to 1% of prior year enrollment non-structurally
switch to any CH in the current year. Attrition >1% indicates if a TPS has >1% of prior year enrollment
non-structurally switch to any charter in the current year. Attrition equal to zero is the omitted category. Non-
structural switchers are students that switch schools when they could have stayed an additional year at their prior
school. Higher-Achieve CH indicators are one if the average lagged test scores of students in a TPS are lower
than the average lagged test scores of students in charter schools from which the TPS is facing attrition. Depen-
dent and independent variables are first differenced with respect to student-school spells to remove student and
school heterogeneity, and the resulting equation is estimated using OLS. I assume persistence is one. Standard
errors are clustered at the school level.
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A.6 Charter School Grade-Spans
Table A.5: Count and Proportion of Charter Schools By Grade-Span When First and Last Observed in the Data
First Year Charter
Observed in Data
Last Year Charter
Observed in Data
Grade Span Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
PK-1 1 0.49 0 0.00
PK-5 1 0.49 0 0.00
PK-8 1 0.49 2 0.97
K-0 1 0.49 0 0.00
K-1 3 1.46 2 0.97
K-2 11 5.34 2 0.97
K-3 14 6.8 3 1.46
K-4 13 6.31 7 3.4
K-5 29 14.08 12 5.83
K-6 28 13.59 15 7.28
K-7 5 2.43 12 5.83
K-8 21 10.19 52 25.24
K-9 1 0.49 6 2.91
K-10 1 0.49 4 1.94
K-11 0 0.00 3 1.46
K-12 5 2.43 31 15.05
1-3 1 0.49 0 0.00
1-5 0 0.00 1 0.49
1-6 1 0.49 0 0.00
1-7 1 0.49 0 0.00
1-8 1 0.49 0 0.00
1-11 1 0.49 0 0.00
1-12 1 0.49 1 0.49
2-8 1 0.49 1 0.49
3-8 0 0.00 1 0.49
4-4 1 0.49 0 0.00
4-8 2 0.97 1 0.49
4-9 1 0.49 1 0.49
5-5 1 0.49 0 0.00
5-6 2 0.97 1 0.49
5-7 1 0.49 1 0.49
5-8 2 0.97 1 0.49
5-12 0 0.00 2 0.97
6-6 2 0.97 0 0.00
6-7 1 0.49 0 0.00
6-8 7 3.4 3 1.46
6-9 2 0.97 0 0.00
6-10 3 1.46 4 1.94
6-11 0 0.00 1 0.49
6-12 11 5.34 12 5.83
7-8 0 0.00 1 0.49
7-10 1 0.49 0 0.00
7-12 3 1.46 1 0.49
8-9 1 0.49 1 0.49
8-11 0 0.00 1 0.49
8-12 2 0.97 2 0.97
9-9 3 1.46 0 0.00
9-10 6 2.91 2 0.97
9-11 2 0.97 1 0.49
9-12 10 4.85 15 7.28
Total 206 100 206 100
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A.7 Charter and Traditional Public School Location in North Carolina
Figure A.2: Charter and Traditional Public School Location in North Carolina in 2016: Schools Serving a Grade
in 3 through 8
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